Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 35 | Number 1

Article 3

1-1-2012

Competitive entertainment: Implications of the
NFL lockout litigation for sports, theatre, music,
and video entertainment
Henry H. Perritt Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Henry H. Perritt Jr., Competitive entertainment: Implications of the NFL lockout litigation for sports, theatre, music, and video entertainment,
35 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 95 (2012).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol35/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Competitive entertainment:
Implications of the NFL lockout litigation
for sports, theatre, music, and video
entertainment
by
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR. ∗
I. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 96
II. Background of the NFL controversy ...............................................................................101
III. Entertainment product and labor markets .....................................................................108
A. Industry structures and labor markets .....................................................................108
1. Corporate structures ..........................................................................................108
2. Sports and the rest – similarities and differences............................................110
3. Proximity of labor and product markets: thickness of the production
function ...............................................................................................................118
4. Geographic scope...............................................................................................119
5. Strength of worker attachment .........................................................................119
6. Bifurcation of live performances and recordings............................................119
7. Day jobs ..............................................................................................................120
8. Stratification .......................................................................................................120
9. Cross subsidization ............................................................................................121
10. Sources of revenue .............................................................................................121
11. Stickiness of demand .........................................................................................122
12. Financing ............................................................................................................122
13. Attitude toward collective bargaining .............................................................122
14. Defining the boundary between product and labor markets.........................123

∗

Professor of Law and former Dean, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Member of the bar:
Virginia (inactive), Pennsylvania (inactive), District of Columbia, Maryland, Illinois,
Supreme Court of the United States. Professor Perritt is the author of more than a dozen
books and eighty law review articles on labor and employment, law and technology,
international affairs, Kosovo, and entertainment law. He is a playwright, screenwriter, and
musician, having written and produced a musical, two full-length straight plays, a movie
screenplay, several short plays, authored three novels, and recorded two music albums. He
appreciates good research, analysis, and ideas from his research assistant, Jeremy B.
Abrams.
95

96

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[35:1

B. College sports—the enigma ......................................................................................124
IV. Analytical approach ..........................................................................................................129
A. Antitrust generally .....................................................................................................129
1. The antitrust laws ...............................................................................................129
2. Rule of reason ....................................................................................................131
B. Labor law ....................................................................................................................134
1. Collective bargaining .........................................................................................134
2. Economic weapons ............................................................................................135
3. The labor exemptions to the antitrust laws—in general ................................137
4. Statutory anti-competitive approaches—FLSA .............................................152
V. Tolerance of certain anti-competitive arrangements .....................................................156
A. Supreme court touchstrones for anti-competitive labor market
arrangements ..............................................................................................................157
B. Concerted refusals to deal .........................................................................................157
C. Salary caps and other limitations on compensation of employees ........................162
D. Employee mobility .....................................................................................................163
E. Assuring a stream of new talent ...............................................................................166
F. Contracting out ..........................................................................................................169
G. Regulating channels for reaching audiences ...........................................................170
H. Sharing new product-market revenue streams........................................................172
I. Limiting competition by independent contractors .................................................173
J. Controlling other labor-market intermediaries ......................................................176
VI. The revolution and the rule of law ..................................................................................176
A. Implications for the future ........................................................................................177
B. Beyond the labor exemption .....................................................................................181
1. Professional Football .........................................................................................182
2. Beyond Professional Football...........................................................................188
6. Two hypothetical scenarios ...............................................................................191
VII. Hope for the future ...........................................................................................................200

I. Introduction
The 2011 dispute between the National Football League (“NFL”
or “League”), representing the football teams, and NFL Players’
Association (“NFLPA,” or “Players,” or “Players Association”), the
union representing its football players, oscillated among the collective
bargaining table, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”),
and the courts. The League preferred labor law as the matrix of the
controversy. The Players preferred antitrust law. Ultimately, the
union’s most powerful weapon was not to withhold player services in
a strike, but to challenge various anti-competitive arrangements
wanted by the teams under the antitrust laws.
The 2011 litigation muted the players’ option to choose between
collective bargaining and antitrust litigation, making it somewhat less
likely that players will alternate between choosing a union as their
representative and then disclaiming it. It makes it clear that the labor
exemption to the antitrust laws runs more broadly than the narrowest
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definition of collective bargaining. It also, considering the sides taken
by the teams and the players, signals that there is something about the
economic structure of product and labor markets in professional
1
sports—and perhaps entertainment industries more generally —that
radically differs from the structure of product and labor markets in
2
other industries.
The controversy was widely publicized and undoubtedly drew
more public attention than any labor-management dispute in recent
years.
Its notoriety provides an opportunity to review the
relationship between federal labor and antitrust law, and more
generally to consider how competition law should operate in the
entertainment industry, which is characterized by many anticompetitive arrangements and pressure to manage new types of
competition arising from a technological revolution.
“Current sports antitrust doctrine is muddled, confusing, and
3
In other words, the law regulating
often incoherent. . .”
4
entertainment labor markets is an ass: it privileges anti-competitive
structures in professional and college football; it leaves college
athletes wholly without protection; and it is irrelevant in the lower
tiers of theatre and moviemaking. The significance of the NFL
lockout is not that it drew some crisp new line defining a boundary of
the labor exemption to the antitrust laws. Rather the lesson it teaches
is that, when the law is healthy, it accommodates itself to realities of
the marketplace. Hopefully that will prove to be the case in the other

1. See generally HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS: A
GUIDE FOR FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, 22-30 (8th ed. 2011) [hereinafter “VOGEL”]
(comparing movies, television, music, broadcasting, cable television, publishing, the
Internet, games, gambling, sports, performing arts, and amusement parts as divisions of
the entertainment industry).
2. See PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, PLAYING FOR DOLLARS: LABOR RELATIONS AND
THE SPORTS BUSINESS, 6 (1996) [hereinafter “STAUDOHAR”] (asserting that professional
sports is part of the entertainment industry and that its industrial relations systems
resemble those of other segments of entertainment industry).
3. Peter Kreher, Antitrust Theory, College Sports, and Interleague Rulemaking: A
new Critique of the NCAA’s Amateurism Rules 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 51, 54 (2006)
(advocating different insights and different rules for sports industry). (this needs the full
citation, I don’t know what it is).
4. “If the law believes that, the law is an ass . . . .” North American Soccer League
v. Nat’l Football League, 505 F.Supp. 659, 659 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (quoting Charles
Dickens, Oliver Twist; and rejecting antitrust challenge to NFL rules prohibiting teams
owners from owning teams in competing leagues), aff’d and rev’d on other grounds, 670
F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that ban on ownership of teams in competing leagues
violated Sherman Act under rule of reason analysis).
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entertainment industries as well. This article is intended to contribute
to that accommodative outlook.
Collective bargaining, and hence the labor exemption, is of small
and diminishing importance as the revolution in major parts of the
entertainment industry gains momentum. In theatre and movie
production, workers must seek protection politically and through the
minimum-wage laws, while producers seek legitimate—and
illegitimate—limits on competition under the antitrust rule of reason.
Ultimately, market forces, changing with technological advances, will
dominate, not law.
It is widely accepted that antitrust law regulates product markets,
5
6
while labor law regulates labor markets. The boundary between the
two is the boundary of the labor exemption to the antitrust laws.
7
That boundary is, however, inherently artificial Successful collective
bargaining and compliance with other labor law increases labor costs,
8
and this reduces output and/or increases prices in product markets.
Unionized employers will be driven out of business by non-union
competitors unless collective bargaining is accompanied by some kind
of product-market restraints. Labor market restraints can be
identical to product market restraints prohibited by the antitrust
9
laws, or collateral regulation of product market competition can be
indirect and subtle. In any event, “without economic refinement,
rewards obtained from effect on the product market and those
10
obtained from effect on the labor market are inextricable.”
The literature about the labor exemption—and on collective
bargaining in general—assumes that the question is how to increase
the welfare of workers without damaging the product market too
much. In the context of this article, the question is different: it
considers how to adapt the antitrust laws to a socially beneficial
revolution that mainly affects product markets and increases
consumer welfare. The revolution contracts the boundary between

5. Labor law is not just the law of collective bargaining, but also includes minimum
wage and maximum-hour law, worker’s compensation law, and unemployment
compensation law.
6. See Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 STANFORD L. REV. 991,
992-95 (1986).
7. Id. at 993.
8. Id. at 997.
9. Id. at 999 (characterizing insights of Archibald Cox).
10. Id. at 998.
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labor markets and product markets and also makes the boundary less
distinct.
In professional sports the interesting conflicts are at the top. In
the other entertainment industries the interesting conflicts are at the
bottom. The technological revolution is leading to disintermediation
and fragmentation of production and consumption. That means that
the firms and players at the top are threatened by those at the
bottom.
This article describes those revolutionary phenomena and
explains why the boundaries of the labor exemptions are particularly
difficult to define in the entertainment industries, including
professional sports. It also predicts that controversies over the scope
of the labor exemptions and broader controversies over the
application of antitrust law will become more frequent as technology
enables employers to push more work beyond the boundaries of
conventional firms and opens up new revenue opportunities for
employers and some employees. Technology’s tendency to blur the
boundaries separating employment from entrepreneurship also will
strain the line separating labor from product markets.
Technology lowers barriers to entry for performers, increasing
competition, and complicating dealmaking among an increased
number of market participants. At the same time, however,
technology also offers new ways to facilitate market transactions,
potentially reducing transaction costs. Technology permits sources of
different kinds of services to find each other, to make deals for an
integrated product, and then to find consumers and fans interested in
it.
The effect will be to push more controversies about the legality of
relevant action from the relatively certain territory of traditional
interpretations of the labor exemptions into less familiar territory,
testing the boundaries of the exemptions and necessitating balancing
of anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects under antitrust law’s
rule of reason.
This article begins with a brief review of the NFL lockout
litigation. Then it analyzes the special features of entertainment
product and labor markets and recapitulates basic antitrust and laborlaw concepts and their application to specific restrictions on
competition common in entertainment markets. It argues that overaggressive definition and enforcement of copyright is probably the
greatest threat to realization of the fruits of new technologies in the
entertainment field.
Copyright provides an anti-competitive
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beachhead for extending anticompetitive mechanisms at least as
11
strong as collective bargaining.
Finally, it explores technology’s revolution in major parts of the
industry, and explains how there is hope for the future. The
technological revolution—not the present one but the previous one—
has already changed the landscape of NFL economics, shifting the
most relevant revenue stream to television broadcast revenues. This
is a foreshadowing of what is beginning to happen in the rest of the
entertainment industry.
Defining the boundaries of the “entertainment industry” is
challenging. To make the analysis manageable, the article focuses on
professional football—the NFL—as representative of professional
sports more generally, occasionally noting relevant developments in
other sports. Professional football produced the recent litigation that
invited the inquiry. It uses popular music, including rock and
country, as the exemplar for music, saving symphony orchestras and
dance bands for someone else or another time. It ranges more
broadly with respect to theatre and movies, including the spectrum
from Broadway plays to storefront community theatre, and the
spectrum from Hollywood blockbuster to narrative YouTube videos.
The broader scope for scripted entertainment is warranted because it
is here where the impact of the technological revolution is most
intense. The limited scope for music is warranted because symphony
orchestras and dance bands account for a relatively small part of
music consumption, and they—symphony orchestras, anyway—are
organized completely differently from other parts of the music
industry.

11. See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New Architectures for Music: Law Should Get
Out of the Way, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 259 (2007) [hereinafter “Perritt, New
Architectures for Music]; Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Flanking the DRM Maginot Line Against
New Music Markets, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L LAW 113 (2007) [hereinafter Perritt, Flanking
the DRM]; Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Music Markets and Mythologies, 9 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 831 (2010) [hereinafter Perritt, Music Markets]; Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
New Business Models for Music, 18 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 63 (2010)
[hereinafter Perritt, New Business Models for Music]; Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cut in Tiny
Pieces: Ensuring that Fragmented Ownership Does Not Chill Creativity, 14 VANDERBILT J.
ENT. & TECH.L. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Perritt, Cut in Tiny Pieces].
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II. Background of the NFL controversy
For the last sixty years, the interplay between labor and antitrust
law has shaped collective bargaining in the professional football
industry.
Professional football did not establish a significant presence in the
12
public mind until the late 1930s. The Players Association emerged
in the mid-1950s, but the NFL refused to deal with it until the
13
Association threatened antitrust litigation against the League. In
14
the Supreme Court held that professional
Radovich v. NFL,
15
football—unlike major league baseball —was not categorically
exempt from the antitrust laws. Eleven years later, the National
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) recognized the NFL Players

12. STAUDOHAR, supra note 2 at 57-58.
13. Id. at 65.
14. 352 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1957).
15. In Fed’l Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922), the Supreme Court exempted professional baseball
from the Sherman Act by concluding that it did not involve interstate commerce.
In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam), the Court
adhered to its decision in Federal Baseball Club, in a very similar baseball case, premised
on the baseball industry’s reliance on that decision and Congress’s failure to overturn it.
346 U.S. at 79.
In Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), the Supreme Court
declined to extend the baseball exemption beyond baseball, suggesting that Federal
Baseball was wrongly decided. Id. at 452. The Court was unwilling to overrule it, however,
because:
“[M]ore harm would be done in overruling Federal Base Ball than in upholding a
ruling which at best was of dubious validity. Vast efforts had gone into the development
and organization of baseball since that decision and enormous capital had been invested in
reliance on its permanence. Congress had chosen to make no change. All this, combined
with the flood of litigation that would follow its repudiation, the harassment that would
ensue, and the retroactive effect of such a decision, led the Court to the practical result
that it should sustain the unequivocal line of authority reaching over many years.” Id. at
450-451.
The Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub.L. 105-297, Oct. 27, 1998, 112 Stat. 2824 (1998),
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2006), partially repealed the baseball exemption to “to state
that major league baseball players are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that major
league baseball players will have the same rights under the antitrust laws as do other
professional athletes, e.g., football and basketball players), along with a provision that
makes it clear that the passage of this Act does not change the application of the antitrust
laws in any other context or with respect to any other person or entity.” 15 U.S.C. § 26b
(quoting purpose section of Curt Flood Act).
In United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955), the Supreme Court declined to apply
the baseball exemption to theatrical productions, reasoning that the baseball exemption
was limited by a narrow application of stare decisis, the same reasoning applied by the
Court two years later to football, in Radivitch.
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Association (“NFLPA”) as the exclusive bargaining representative of
all NFL players, and the NFL and the NFLPA entered into their first
16
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).
In 1972, several players filed an antitrust action against the
17
League in Mackey v. NFL, alleging that the League’s “Rozelle
Rule,” restricting movement of free agents—players whose contracts
with a particular team have expired—violated § 1 of the Sherman
Act. The court concluded that the restriction violated § 1 because it
was significantly more restrictive than necessary to serve any
legitimate purpose of maintaining competitive balance in the NFL.
While the Mackey litigation was pending, the collective agreement
between the League and the Players Association expired, and
seventy-eight NFL players filed a separate class action antitrust suit
18
against the League. In 1977, the League and the players entered
into a settlement agreement incorporating a new collective bargaining
agreement that implemented a revised system of free agency known
19
as “right of first refusal/compensation.”
In December 1982, the Players engaged in a fifty-seven-day strike
before agreeing to a new collective agreement that included a
modified version of the “right of first refusal/compensation” system.
This agreement expired in 1987, and when negotiations for a new
CBA proved unsuccessful, the Players struck again and filed an
20
antitrust suit in Powell v. NFL, alleging among other things that the
League’s free agency restrictions violated the Sherman Act. On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the nonstatutory labor exemption
21
applied, pursuant to Mackey.
Two days after the Powell decision, in November, 1989, the
Players Association abandoned collective bargaining rights in an
effort to end the NFL’s nonstatutory labor exemption. The Players
Association disclaimed its union status, enacted new bylaws
prohibiting it from engaging in collective bargaining with the League,
filed a labor organization termination notice with the U.S.
Department of Labor, obtained a reclassification by the Internal

16. See Brady v. NFL, 644 F.3d 661, 663-664 (8th Cir. 2011) (detailing history).
17. 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976).
18. See Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280, 282 (8th Cir.1978); Alexander v. NFL, No. 4–
76–123, 1977 WL 1497, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 1, 1977).
19. Brady, 644 F.3d at 664 (detailing history).
th
20. 678 F.Supp. 777, 780–81 (D. Minn. 1988), rev’d, 930 F.2d 1293 (8 Cir. 1989).
21. Powell, 930 F.2d at 1298.
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Revenue Service as a “business league” rather than a labor
organization, and notified the NFL that it would no longer represent
22
players in grievance proceedings.
In 1990, eight individual football players brought a new antitrust
23
action against the League in McNeil v. NFL, contending that new
player restraints imposed by the League during the 1990–1991 season
violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. On September 10, 1992, following a
ten-week trial, a jury found the NFL in violation § 1 of the Sherman
24
Antitrust Act. The individual players then sought injunctive relief
25
to become free agents for the 1992 season. Two new antitrust
lawsuits were filed in the two-week period after the McNeil verdict.
26
Ten NFL players brought suit in Jackson v. NFL, alleging that the
League’s free agency restrictions violated the Sherman Act. Five
27
other NFL players instituted White v. NFL, a class action alleging
that various practices of the League, including free agency restraints,
the college draft, and the use of a standard NFL player contract,
violated the antitrust laws.
In January 1993, the parties reached a tentative agreement to
resolve White and related cases.
The Players Association
subsequently collected authorization cards from NFL players
redesignating the organization as the players’ exclusive collective
bargaining representative, and the NFL voluntarily recognized the
NFLPA as the players’ union on March 29, 1993. The district court
approved the parties’ Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (“SSA”)
in April 1993, and the NFL and the NFLPA entered into a new
collective agreement shortly thereafter, amending the SSA to
conform to the provisions of the new collective agreement. The
district court approved the requested amendments in a consent
decree issued on August 20, 1993, retaining jurisdiction to supervise

22. Brady, 644 F.3d at 664-665.
23. 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). See McNeil v. Nat’l Football League (Plan B Free Agency),
No. 4–90–476, 1992 WL 315292, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1992).
25. See Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, 802 F.Supp. 226, 228 (D.Minn.1992); White
v. Nat’l Football League, 822 F.Supp. 1389 (D.Minn.1993).
26. Jackson, 802 F.Supp. at 228–29, 234 n. 14.
27. White, 822 F.Supp. at 1395.
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its implementation. The parties amended and extended the collective
28
agreement in 1996 and 1998 and 2006.
In 1996, the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,29
holding that that the nonstatutory labor exemption applied to
employer conduct that occurred during and immediately after a
collective-bargaining negotiation when it involved a mandatory
subject of bargaining that grew out of the bargaining process.
After 1993, the Players and the League operated under the White
SSA, and the district court continued to oversee the settlement by
resolving numerous disputes over the terms of the SSA and CBA.
Whenever the NFL and the Players Association agreed to change a
provision in the collective agreement, a conforming change was also
made to the SSA. The SSA was thus amended several times, most
recently in 2006, when the NFL and the NFLPA adopted a new
collective agreement, which ran through the 2012–2013 football
season. Either side could opt out of the final two years of the
agreement upon written notice.
In May 2008, the NFL opted out of the final two years of the SSA
and CBA, citing concerns about operating costs and other elements
30
of the agreements.
A major issue in the 2011 dispute was the teams’ demand that the
31
players reduce their share of television revenues. Approximately
half of NFL revenues come from broadcast contracts with the
32
networks. Sharing television revenues is a mandatory subject of
bargaining under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations

28. White v. Nat’l Football League, 766 F. Supp. 2d 941, 944 (D. Minn. 2011)
(describing history of SSA and collective bargaining agreement); 644 F.3d at 665 (detailing
history).
29. 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
30. Brady, 644 F.3d at 666-67 (detailing history).
31. See Clay Moorhead, Revenue Sharing and the Salary Cap in the NFL: Perfecting
the Balanace Between NFL Socialism and Unrestrained Free-Trade, 8 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 641, 678 (2006) [hereinafter “Moorhead”] (reporting on early negotiation
stances: players want 64% of total revenues; owners refuse to relinquish more than 57%).
32. White, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 945; “The NFL’s national media revenue is the
backbone of the business;” Jake I. Fisher, The NFL’s Current Business Model and the
Potential
2011
Lockout
20
(May
4,
2010),
http://harvardsportsanalysis.files.wordpress.com/2009/09/the-nfl-business-model-andpotential-lockout.pdf [hereinafter “Fisher paper”]. For example, the Green Bay Packers
earned 38% of its revenue in 2009 from TV and radio broadcasting, 15% from merch sales
and licensing and endorsements, and only 20% from ticket sales. Id. at 21.
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Act. 33 The League and the Players Association negotiated for two
years over a new agreement to take effect in March 2011 after the
existing agreement expired. As a result, the SSA and CBA were
scheduled to expire in early March 2011. Although the NFL and the
NFLPA engaged in more than two years of negotiations, they were
unable to reach an agreement. The League filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the NLRB in February 2011, asserting that the
34
union failed to confer in good faith.
As the deadline approached, the players voted to end the Players
Association status as their collective bargaining representative. On
March 11, 2011—the expiration date of the SSA and CBA—the
Players Association notified the NFL that it disclaimed interest in
continuing to serve as the players’ collective bargaining
representative, effective at 4:00 p.m. The Players Association also
amended its bylaws to prohibit collective bargaining with the League
or its agents, filed a labor organization termination notice with the
Department of Labor, asked the Internal Revenue Service to
reclassify the NFLPA as a professional association rather than a labor
organization, and notified the NFL that it would no longer represent
players bringing grievances against the League.
The League filed an amended unfair labor practice charge on
March 11, alleging that the NFLPA’s disclaimer was a “sham” and
that the combination of a disclaimer by the union and subsequent
antitrust litigation was “a ploy and an unlawful subversion of the
35
collective bargaining process.”
Individual players, funded by the Players Association, filed suit
on the same day as the disclaimer—March 11, 2011—in Brady v.
36
They alleged that the anticipated lockout violated the
NFL.
Sherman Act, and that other anticipated league actions, including a
limitation on the amount of compensation that can be paid to recently
drafted first-year “rookie” players, a cap on salaries for current
players, and “franchise player” and “transition player” designations
that restrict the ability of free agents to join a team other than their

33. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006). See Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild of
Am., 531 F. Supp. 578, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that share of pay television revenues
was a form of profit sharing and therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining).
34. Brady, 644 F.3d at 666-67.
35. Id. at 667.
36. Id. (detailing history).
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former team were anticompetitive practices that similarly violated the
37
Act.
On March 12, the League instituted a lockout of members of the
Players Association bargaining unit, which included professional
football players under contract, free agents, and prospective players
who had been drafted by or entered into negotiations with an NFL
team. The NFL informed players under contract that the lockout
would prohibit them from entering League facilities, from receiving
any compensation or benefits, and from performing any employment
duties including playing, practicing, working out, attending meetings,
making promotional appearances, and consulting medical and
training personnel except in limited situations.
On April 25, 2011, the district court granted the Players’ motion
to enjoin the lockout. After staying the injunction, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived the district court of jurisdiction to
38
issue the injunction.
On August 4, 2011, the players and the league entered into a new
collective bargaining agreement to run through the end of the 2020
39
season. It explicitly provided that it superseded any conflicting
40
provisions in the Settlement Agreement. It committed the Players
Association not to file any suit against the NFL or any team or to give
voluntary testimony in support of any issue covered by the
agreement, unless in support of a claim of a breach of the
41
agreement.
Paralleling the antitrust litigation, the players challenged a
unilateral change in the arrangements for sharing television revenue
with the players. In White v. Nat’l Football League (“the 2011
42
television decision”), the district court held that an agreement
negotiated between the NFL and the television networks violated the
White Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (“SSA”), which
resolved the 1987 strike and lockout. After the NFL opted out of the

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 667-68.
Id.at 661.
NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, (Aug. 4, 2011), Art. 69, sec. 1.
Id. at Art. 2, sec. 1.
Id. at Art. 3, sec. 2.
White, 766 F. Supp. 2d 941.
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final two years of the 2006 collective bargaining agreement and SSA, 43
the union claimed that an agreement to extend and renegotiate
broadcast contracts with DirecTV, CBS, Fox, NBC, and ESPN
violated the NFL’s obligation under the SSA to act in good faith and
use best efforts to maximize total revenues for both the NFL and the
44
Players for each SSA playing season. Shortly after that, the League
negotiated extensions of its broadcast contracts to cushion its
economic losses in the event of a strike or lockout.
The district court found that broadcast revenues are “an
45
enormous source of shared revenue” for the Players and the NFL.
It concluded that the League violated the SSA by negotiating with the
broadcasters to advance its own interests and harm the interests of
the players:
[U]nder the terms of the SSA, the NFL is not entitled to
obtain leverage by renegotiating shared revenue contracts,
during the SSA, to generate post-SSA leverage and revenue
to advance its own interests and harm the interests of the
Players. Here, the NFL renegotiated the broadcast contracts
to benefit its exclusive interest at the expense of, and contrary
to, the joint interests of the NFL and the players. This
conduct constitutes “a design. . . to seek an unconscionable
46
advantage” and is inconsistent with good faith.
The court ordered a further hearing to determine appropriate
47
relief that was explicitly to consider both damages and an injunction.
This lawsuit was settled as part of the overall resolution of the 2011
dispute.
This decades-long conflict represents not a traditional labormanagement controversy, but a struggle by participants in an
entertainment industry to reconcile the pro-competitive mandates of
the antitrust law with the practical necessity of anti-competitive
measures to enhance the attractiveness of the entertainment product.
Self-interest on the part of both service providers (the players) and

43. The SSA and the collective agreement originated in 1993. The collective
agreement was amended and extended in 1996, 1998, and 2006. White, 766 F. Supp. 2d at
944.
44. Id. at 943 (describing issue and arguments).
45. White, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 951.
46. Id. at 951.
47. Id. at 854.
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entrepreneurs (the team owners) naturally operates, but that is
inherent in any market.

III. Entertainment product and labor markets
The NFL lockout litigation used the labor exemption to protect
anti-competitive mechanisms in the product market. Antitrust law
focuses on market realities, not formalistic distinctions. Accordingly,
any antitrust analysis must begin with close examination of “the
48
economic reality of the market at issue.” John T. Dunlop’s classic
Industrial Relations Systems emphasizes that industry structure and
the microeconomics of product and labor markets, along with the law,
determine the differing shape of industrial relations systems,
49
including collective bargaining, in different industries. To explore
the implications of the NFL controversy throughout the
entertainment industry, one must begin with an analysis of market
structure.
A. Industry structures and labor markets
1.

Corporate structures

In professional sports, associations of teams, usually called
leagues, exercise significant private regulatory power over individual
50
teams. In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League,
however, the Supreme Court held that the NFL was not a single
enterprise entitled to the intra-enterprise exemption to the antitrust
laws. It provided a useful summary of the structure of the NFL:
The NFL teams do not possess either the unitary
decisionmaking quality or the single aggregation of economic
power characteristic of independent action. Each of the
teams is a substantial, independently owned, and
independently managed business. . . . The teams compete with

48. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 46-467 (1992)
(affirming reversal of summary judgment for defendant in tying and monopolization case
after exhaustive exploration of the dynamics of supply and demand in carefully defined
markets for copying equipment and service); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of
Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 111 (1984) (agreeing with district court that
college football broadcasts constitute separate market).
49. See STAUDOHAR, supra note 2, at 4-5 (applying Dunlop’s insights to professional
sports labor markets).
50. 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010).
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one another, not only on the playing field, but to attract fans,
for gate receipts and for contracts with managerial and
51
playing personnel.
Baseball and hockey are organized like football. Soccer is
52
different. In Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., the court of
appeals reviewed the industry structure for professional soccer in the
United States in considering a single-entity defense:
MLS has, to say the least, a unique structure, even for a sports
league. MLS retains significant centralized control over both
league and individual team operations. MLS owns all of the
teams that play in the league (a total of 12 prior to the start of
2002), as well as all intellectual property rights, tickets,
supplied equipment, and broadcast rights. MLS sets the
teams’ schedules; negotiates all stadium leases and assumes all
related liabilities; pays the salaries of referees and other
53
league personnel; and supplies certain equipment.
The controversy involved the league’s control over player
recruitment.
In a nutshell, MLS recruits the players, negotiates their
salaries, pays them from league funds, and, to a large extent,
determines where each of them will play. For example, to
balance talent among teams, it decides, with the non-binding
input of team operators, where certain of the league’s
54
“marquee” players will play.
The league contracts with investors to operate nine of the
League’s twelve teams. The operator/investors hire general managers
and coaches and may trade players with other teams or pick players
55
in the League draft, but pay not bid independently for players. They
56
also must comply with a salary cap. A class of players claimed that
the agreement not to compete for player services violated section 1 of

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 2212-13.
284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002).
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 54.
Id.
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the Sherman Act. 57 The court rejected the claims on marketdefinition grounds, but suggested that even outside the classic single
58
entity situation exemplied by Copperweld, the rule of reason might
show flexibility for interdependent multi-party enterprises. Sports
leagues are a primary example, but so are common franchising
arrangements and joint ventures that perform specific services for
59
competitors. The Court also noted Justice Rehnquist’s argument
that all sports leagues be treated as single entities because they must
60
collaborate to produce a product.
The rest of the entertainment industry is even more decentralized
than professional football. Corporate entities, partnerships or sole
proprietorships are the units of production. Trade associations exist,
but exercise no regulatory power outside the standards-setting and
enforcement arena. Collective licensing of copyrights for music is the
61
notable exception.
2.

Sports and the rest – similarities and differences

Entertainment industry product markets have characteristics that
distinguish all of them from other industry product markets. Each
entertainment industry also has product-market features that
distinguish it from other entertainment-industries.
The structure of the markets for professional sports is
dramatically different from that of non-entertainment industries.
Ethan Lock identified the following attributes of product markets in
professional football:
1. No real substitutes exist for the NFL product;
2. The NFL regulates intra-league competition for fans and
players, in the interest of competitive balance;
3. The NFL competes with no other football league for
62
either players or fans.

57. Id. at 54-55.
58. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 762 (1984).
59. Fraser, 284 F.3d. at 58.
60. Id. at 55, citing NFL v. N. Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
61. See Perritt, Cut in Tiny Pieces, supra note 11, at 64 (detailing history and
operation of copyright collectives).
62. Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989
DUKE L.J. 339, 354-59 (1989) (explaining uniqueness of employer-employee relationships
in professional sports).
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The peculiar economics of the professional sports industry make
application of antitrust- and labor-law doctrines developed for
manufacturing and most service industries awkward. In most
industries, each firm seeks to avoid competition. In professional
sports, a team cannot gain fans unless it has credible competition. In
most industries, a firm seeks to extinguish its competitors. In
professional sports, a team has an incentive to build up its
competitors; if the competition is too weak, games will not be
interesting, and the audience will fall off. Leagues such as the NFL
developed to management these problems. “Sports leagues are . . .
cartels that exist to allocate and control the [product] and [labor] and
to eliminate within the cartel competition over . . . players and . . .
63
fans.”
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
have recognized the salience of unique product-market features in
64
construing the antitrust laws. In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the
Supreme Court held that restrictions by the NCAA on broadcasts of
college football games violated the Sherman Act:
By participating in an association which prevents member
institutions from competing against each other on the basis of
price or kind of television rights that can be offered to
broadcasters, the NCAA member institutions have created a
horizontal restraint—an agreement among competitors on the
way in which they will compete with one another. . . . By
restraining the quantity of television rights available for sale,
the challenged practices create a limitation on output; our
cases have held that such limitations are unreasonable
65
restraints of trade.
Nevertheless, it noted the special characteristics of sports:
“Some activities can only be carried out jointly. . . . What the
NCAA and its member institutions market in this case is
competition itself—contests between competing institutions.
Of course, this would be completely ineffective if there were
no rules on which the competitors agreed to create and define
63. ROBERT C. BERRY ET. AL., LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS at
text accompanying n.10, (1986) [hereinafter Berry, Labor Relations].
64. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
65. Id. at 99-100.
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the competition to be marketed. A myriad of rules affecting
such matters as the size of the field, the number of players on
a team, and the extent to which physical violence is to be
encouraged or proscribed, all must be agreed upon, and all
restrain the manner in which institutions compete. Moreover,
the NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football—
college football. . . . In order to preserve the character and
quality of the “product,” athletes must not be paid, must be
required to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the
“product” cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement;
if an institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its
effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might soon
be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling
college football to preserve its character, and as a result
enables a product to be marketed which might otherwise be
unavailable. In performing this role, its actions widen
consumer choice—not only the choices available to sports
fans but also those available to athletes—and hence can be
66
viewed as procompetitive.
These pro-competitive tendencies could offset anti-competitive
67
effects in a rule of reason analysis. Finding no pro-competitive
effects to offset the anti-competitive effects of the NCAA rules
limiting television broadcasts of games, however, the Court affirmed
68
the lower courts’ finding of a Sherman Act violation.
In American Needle, 69 the Supreme Court acknowledged that the
single-entity theory might shield certain types of NFL conduct:
Football teams that need to cooperate are not trapped by
antitrust law. “[T]he special characteristics of this industry
may provide a justification” for many kinds of agreements.
The fact that NFL teams share an interest in making the
entire league successful and profitable, and that they must
cooperate in the production and scheduling of games,
provides a perfectly sensible justification for making a host of
collective decisions. But the conduct at issue in this case is

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 101-02.
Id. at 103-04 (distinguishing per-se from rule-of-reason analysis).
Id. at 120.
130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
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still concerted activity under the Sherman Act that is subject
to § 1 analysis.
....
We have recognized, for example, that the interest in
maintaining a competitive balance” among “athletic teams is
legitimate and important. While that same interest applies to
the teams in the NFL, it does not justify treating them as a
single entity for § 1 purposes when it comes to the marketing
of the teams’ individually owned intellectual property. It is,
however, unquestionably an interest that may well justify a
70
variety of collective decisions made by the teams.
Ethan Lock identified the following attributes of the labor market
in professional football:
1. The value of a player depends not only on skills, but also
on the player’s attitude, conduct, age, and relationship
with teammates;
2. Players have limited community of interest;
3. Players have limited job security and short working lives;
4. The NFL is the only buyer of player skills, which are not
71
generally transferrable to other industries.
Professional sports share most of these characteristics. That
baseball is treated differently from other sports is an anomalous
72
result of the doctrine of stare decisis.
Each of these attributes applies to the labor markets in other
entertainment industries such as theatre and movies. Each of them,
except the last, applies to the popular music industry, where there is
sharp competition among record labels and other, newer
intermediaries that link the labor market to the product market.
Collective bargaining in the popular music industry, unlike
professional sports, theatre, and movies is of only marginal

70. Id. at 2216-17.
71. Lock, supra note 62 at 354-359 (explaining uniqueness of employer-employee
relationships in professional sports).
72. Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1188 (11th Cir. 2003) (applying
baseball exemption but noting “dubious” application of stare decisis to preserve it).
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importance because most musicians—particularly those performing
popular music—are not traditional employees entitled to engage in
collective bargaining.
Labor costs are important in all of the entertainment industries.
73
Player payrolls consume more than half of total NFL revenue. In the
movie industry, cast expenses comprise slightly less than 20% of the
74
budget. Broadway’s “Spiderman” reported that artistic labor costs
75
account for 19% of production costs and 33% of running costs. In
indie theatre, the percentages are a good bit lower, because personnel
often are unpaid. One study of off-off-Broadway products concluded
76
that about 16% of the total budget was for artistic labor.
Though professional sports and other entertainment industries
share some characteristics, they also differ in important ways. They
are similar in that they depend on celebrity to draw audiences. They
77
are similar in that their production is episodic: fans consume
78
specific performances, games, movies, or musical works.
They are similar in that most players or performers have
relatively short careers. They are similar in that they employ
institutional frameworks to aggregate and concentrate the selection
of talent: the draft in professional football; auditions for movies and
plays. In this respect the labor markets are more highly organized
than in most other industries, in which employment decisions occur
on a purely ad-hoc basis, involving individual employees.

73. Fisher Paper, supra note 32 at 21 (reporting 57% in 2008).
74. See RALPH S. SINGLETON, FILM BUDGETING 7, 62 (1996) (detailing cost
categories and cast costs for $15 million movie; “cast unit” accounting for 19.67% of total);
DEKE SIMON, FILM AND VIDEO BUDGETS 230 (2010) (budget line items for $5 million
feature film; “cast” and “extra talent” categories accouning for 17.98% of total).
75. Letter from Christopher A. Cacace Gen. Mgr. of Rosenberg, Neuwirth, &
Kuchner to Elizabeth Block, Assisstant Attorney General of the Office of the New York
Attorney
General,
Attaching
Financial
Statements
(June
2,
2011),
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/206114/8-legged-productions-llc-2011-01-02financial.pdf.
76. Statistical Analysis of Off-Off-Broadway Budgets, NEW YORK THEATRE FOUND.,
8 (April 2008), http://www.nyitawards.com/survey/OOBBudgetStudy.pdf (7% for actors,
including productions that did not pay actors; 4% for designed, including unpaid
designers, 5% for director, stage manager, and crew).
77. “Consumption” of entertainment includes attending a live event such as a
football game, performance of a play, or music concert, and watching or listening to a
game, a movie, or a music recording.
78. The more episodic the delivery of services to the audience, the more likely
independent contractor status is rather than employee status. See § IV.B.9 (detailing
criteria for distinguishing employees from independent contractors).

2012]

COMPETITIVE ENTERTAINMENT

115

Professional sports, theatre, and live music also are similar in that
the product is consumed as it is produced. Football games, plays, and
concerts can be recorded of course, but there is little market for such
recordings. Movies and recorded music are similar in that production
and consumption are separated. Capital is invested in making a
studio recording or a movie on speculation, in the hope that
consumption will be sufficient to provide a return on the investment.
In all of the relevant industries, the supply of labor greatly
exceeds the demand. Many more people would like to play
79
professional football than there are slots on teams. Many more
actors would like to be in movies or stage plays than there are roles in
productions. Many more musicians would like to perform than there
are opportunities—although it is relatively easy for a musician to
perform locally at small venues or at open-mic events. At the same
time, professional athletes, actors, and musicians are not fungible.
Each has unique characteristics that make him desirable or
undesirable for a particular role. A football team would not recruit
Tim Tebow to play guard. A casting director would not select
Anthony Hopkins to play one of the young lovers in Brokeback
Mountain or Justin Bieber to play a heavy in a gangster movie. Those
distinguishing characteristics, however, are not all objectively
measurable. One can measure the velocity of a quarterback’s pass,
80
the size of his hands and feet, and time how fast he runs the 40-yard
dash, but one can only guess at his leadership ability, pain threshold,
charisma, and determination to win. Likewise, it is not difficult to
determine if a singer has accurate pitch and a good sense of rhythm,
but how truly he will portray the director’s idea of a particular
character in a musical is a matter of artistic judgment. One therefore
would not expect labor markets to be organized by mechanical rules
common in other industries, such as seniority systems or selection or
promotion strictly according to objective test results.

79. Each of the 32 teams in the NFL are allowed 53 players on its roster. NFL
Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 39, at art. 25 § 4 available at
https://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/2011CBA.pdf (limiting total on each
team’s active and inactive player lists to 53 players); http://www.nfl.com/teams (listing 32
teams comprising NFL).
80. See Thomas Jackson, QB’s Hands: does Size really matter...?, EAGLES EYE, (June
19, 2010, 17:24) http://www.eagleseyeblog.com/qbs-hands-does-size-really-matter.html
(reporting hand size of different NFL quarterbacks and discussing why hand size might
matter)
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In the most visible parts of entertainment industries 81 the labor
input comprises sharply differentiated skills and personalities. No
one would consider Tom Brady fungible with Brett Favre in terms of
personality or leadership styles.
No one would view Casey
82
83
Matthews as equivalent to Brian Urlacher in terms of skills and
experience. No one would imagine Zac Efron or Jensen Ackles well
suited for the same roles on stage or screen at as Anthony Hopkins or
Jack Nicholson. A beginning actor cannot provide the star quality
that many movie and theatre producers believe is necessary to attract
an audience for a large-budget production.
The bargaining structures for entertainment industries reflect the
differing characteristics of the relevant labor markets. Bargaining
structures are similar for different sports involving multi-employer
bargaining; comprehensive player representation and membership;
and two-tier bargaining in which the collective agreement provides a
comprehensive framework for regulation of the labor market for each
sport.
Bargaining structures also regulate certain aspects of the
product market to assure competitive stability, while salaries are
84
negotiated with individual players.
Professional sports labor markets share common characteristics:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Careers of players are short—3-5 years;
Rules limit player mobility from team to team;
85
Television broadcast revenues are important;
Vertical integration is limited, although there may be a
trend for entertainment conglomerates to acquire teams;
5. Anti-trust law plays a disproportional role in regulating
labor markets and their interaction with product markets;
and
86
6. Non-union intermediaries such as agents are important.

81. In other less visible parts, many conventional employees toil away at performing
accounting, marketing, information-technology, property-management, human-resource
and scheduling functions. There is nothing particularly unusual about the labor markets
for their services.
82. 2011 draft-pick rookie linebacker for Philadelphia Eagles.
83. Veteran middle linebacker for the Chicago Bears.
84. See STRAUDOHAR, supra note 2, at 10-11 (describing bargaining structure in
professional sports).
85. For example, in 2000, close to 60% of the Green Bay Packers’ revenue came
from television, 20% from tickets to games, and about 20% from “other”—mainly
licensing of logos and paraphernalia. VOGEL, supra note 1, at 454.
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Theatrical and movie labor markets also share common
characteristics, but also exhibit differences:
1. Careers of actors are short, either because their celebrity
status wanes, or, in lower ends of the market, because they
87
give up on being able to make a living from their art;
88
2. Product markets are highly stratified,
3. With the bottom tier growing in importance;
4. Most actors and production personnel work on a projectby-project basis;
5. The workforce for each project is assembled on an ad-hoc
basis; while there are repeat players, they must compete
anew for each new project through auditions,
6. Collective bargaining governs labor markets in the upper
tiers, but even there, many workers are not covered by
collectively bargained terms.
The differing product-market characteristics of professional
sports as compared with other entertainment industries result in
differences in labor markets. Professional athletes have relatively
long term relationships with their teams, and theatre actors have
relationships with their producers for the run of a play; in the movie
industry, actors have only fleeting relationships with their producers,
where actor employment is terminated after a movie is shot—long
before any consumers pay to see it. Until recently, musicians had
relatively long-term relationships with their record labels, but the

86. STAUDOHAR, supra note 2, at 168-173 (“Commonality of Sports Models”).
87. See generally Perritt, New Business Models for Music, supra note 11, at 111-36
(describing life cycle of indie musician). The life cycle of most actors is similar; they go to
Chicago, study at Second City, Steppenwolf, the Artistic Home, or at dozens of other
acting studios, get some roles in off-Loop theatre, and then go to New York or
Hollywood, wait tables, and eventually come home to take up other careers, perhaps
continuing to act on the side.
88. In 2009, there were some 1825 regional non-profit theatres, compared with
Broadway theatres numbering in the dozens. VOGEL, supra note 1, at 497 n.7. The nonprofit theatre segment of the industry, comprising mainly off-Broadway and regional
theatres earned $811 million in revenue in 2009. Id. at 497 n.7. Contributions exceeded
revenue, comprising $969 million, or 54%. Id. Broadway shows earned $939 million from
Broadway productions in 2007, and $950 from road shows, often performed by regional
producers. Id.. at 482.
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model is changing, so that the relationship between a musician and a
producer may end once a song or album is recorded.
3.

Proximity of labor and product markets: thickness of the production
function

The labor markets differ in other important ways. The proximity
of labor markets to product markets, reflected in the thickness of the
enterprises that connect, varies dramatically. The firms connecting
athletes to sports fans—football, baseball, or basketball teams—are
sophisticated enterprises. The same is true for movie production,
distribution, and exhibition enterprises. Music lies at the other
extreme: many singers and instrumentalists are the business entities
that perform for audiences. They arrange their own live gigs and
record and release their own music. In music, there is little
distinction between product and labor markets and existing
distinctions are diminishing. Live drama occupies an intermediate
position, ranging on a continuum from Broadway producers to
89
storefront theatre ensembles. Technology is slimming down the
entrepreneurial intermediation for music and video entertainment,
but not sports.
The thickness of intermediation represents the distinction
between product and labor markets, which, in turn defines the
boundary between antitrust law and labor law. The robustness of the
boundary between labor and product markets depends on the
90
thickness of the production function: how many other inputs are
involved, and how important, relatively, is a particular labor input?
The scope of the labor exemptions to the antitrust laws depends on
separating product from labor markets, but that becomes more
difficult the thinner the production function.
In the lower strata of the popular music industry, there is little
distinction between a worker and entrepreneur. In the top strata of
the professional sports and movie industries there is a major
distinction between the owners, coach, and general manager of a

89. A theatre ensemble is a group of actors who participate in the management of a
theatre, expecting that they will be given priority in the casting of plays the theatre
produces.
90. A production function is a theoretical equation that specifies output as a function
of different combinations of inputs. In basic microeconomics, the traditional inputs are
labor, land, and capital. See DONALD STEVENSON WATSON, PRICE THEORY AND ITS
USES 198 (1963) (illustrating production functions); Perritt, New Architectures for Music,
supra note 11 at 301 (specifying production function for production of popular music).
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team and the players, and between the Hollywood producer and the
actor. The thicker the intermediation, the more likely is employee
status for the talent as opposed to independent contractor status. The
most interesting cases are when the production function is relatively
thick—as in professional sports—but collective-bargaining and
enforcement of other labor laws is weak—as in indie movies and indie
theater.
4.

Geographic scope

The geographic scope of the relevant labor markets differs.
Labor markets for theatre are predominantly regional. To be sure,
many actors relocate to New York or Los Angeles, because that is
where they think they will find opportunities to make it big. But most
actors and casting directors direct their attention to the metropolitan
area in which they live and work.
Labor markets for professional sports, on the other hand are
national—international in the case of soccer and baseball.
Labor markets for movies are predominantly regional, given the
historic concentration of moviemaking enterprises in the Los Angeles
area, and of television enterprises in Los Angeles and New York.
But moviemaking involves—at least since the breakup of the studio
system, beginning in the 1970s—principal photography at locations all
over the world, and some recruiting of talent takes place in or near
shooting locations. The technological revolution, by dispersing movie
production dramatically, means that far more opportunities to work
in moviemaking will be sought and filled locally—within particular
metropolitan areas. Internet-based casting calls are inherently
international, but the likelihood that an applicant will travel a long
distance for an audition is small.
5.

Strength of worker attachment

The length of employment is different. Actors and other talent
for theatre and movies are recruited for particular projects—one run
of a play, one movie. Athletes are recruited to sports teams for
periods of several seasons, or at least one season. Recruiting a
professional football player to play only one game is unheard of.
6.

Bifurcation of live performances and recordings

In music, the recording and live-concert markets are sharply
distinguished, although the same musicians often participate in both.
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In professional sports, consumption of broadcast games and live
games is distinct, but the same event provides the content for both.
7.

Day jobs

Participants in music, theatre, and movie labor markets typically
91
hold other employment—”day jobs” are the norm. Day jobs are
rare in professional sports during the season, but many professional
athletes engage in a variety of non-sports employment off season,
often related to investments made with their substantial salaries.
Outside employment is often closely related to the athlete’s identity
as an athlete, as with product endorsements, which may involve work
during the season.
8.

Stratification

Stratification of the sub-industries differs dramatically.
Professional sports is not very stratified: most of the relevant activity
is centered on the NFL for football, the NBA for basketball, and so
on. Few fans consciously choose between going to an NFL game and
going to a local league game, although some choose between
professional and college football games. College sports are an
enigma analytically. They are considered further in § III(B).
Other entertainment industries are hugely stratified, ranging in
music from Sony to singer-songwriter Trevor Shandling, in movies
from Dreamworks to Troglodyte Productions, and in theatre from the
Schuman theatre chain on Broadway to the Weekend Theatre in
Little Rock.
One might try to force an apples-to-apples comparative analysis
by equating the NFL in professional sports to big Hollywood studios
in moviemaking, big recording labels in music, or Broadway theatre
and Live Nation for concert music. A separate analysis would
address storefront theatre, indie musicians, indie moviemakers,
and/or community football leagues.
The weakness, however, of this apparently tidier horizontal
comparison is that it would obscure important phenomena: the fluid
91. Professor Caves calls them “humdrum jobs.” RICHARD E. CAVES, CREATIVE
INDUSTRIES: CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND COMMERCE 79-80 (2002) (reporting
empirical studies concluding that approximately seventy-five percent of artists of all kinds
have humdrum jobs; income from art produced at most forty-six percent of total income;
and for many, was negative).; see Perritt, New Business Models for Music, supra note 11 at
63 (analyzing life-cycle of indie musicians and the role of day jobs to supplement music
income).
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movement of capital and labor vertically within the music, video
entertainment, and movie industries, and the lack of such movement
in professional sports. It is the increasing possibility of such vertical
movement that poses the greatest likelihood of legal controversies,
considered more fully in § VI(A)(4).
9.

Cross subsidization

Sports leagues force redistribution of revenue among the teams,
92
especially revenue from broadcasting. They allocate players to clubs
through mechanisms such as drafts of new talent, restrictions on
player movement, and compensation to teams losing players to other
93
teams. While some goals, such as the salary cap, are intended to
limit competition in the labor market, others, such as the draft
system, are intended as a way of channeling subsidies to the weaker
94
teams.
10. Sources of revenue

Professional football and the movie industry share the
characteristic that most of the revenue comes from channels that
might be thought ancillary to the main products. Television revenues
account for about 60% of football revenues, compared with only
95
about 20% for attendance at live games. Movie theatre ticket sales
account for only about 20% of the revenue for the movie industry,
compared with 40% for video and DVD rentals and about 40% for
96
television.
Historically, it has been employees who have insisted on a share
of collateral revenue streams, such as television revenues in
professional sports. In the movie industry, it has been the employers
who wanted to share revenue realized after employee performance
was complete, in order to defer employee compensation payments.
As new streams of revenue develop because of new Internet
97
technologies, the struggle to allocate a share to employees will come
from the employees, but it also may come from employers, to the
92. BERRY ET. AL., supra note 61 at text following n.10.
93. Id.
94. See Richard A. Epstein, Stop the Football Merry-Go-Round, HOOVER
INSTITUTION
(Mar.
29,
2011)
http://www.hoover.org/publications/definingideas/article/72996.
95. VOGEL, supra note 1, at 454 (Green Bay Packers in 2000).
96. Id. at 98.
97. See § VI.A.
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extent that the effect is to shift total revenue from early to later
periods of time.
11. Stickiness of demand

Professional sports differ from other entertainment industries in
that professional sports teams have loyal followers, who can be
counted on to attend games and watch games on television. In the
theatre, movie, and popular music industries, by contrast, each new
product offering is completely speculative: most of the costs must be
incurred in advance, to rehearse a play, to shoot and edit a movie, or
to record a song or an album, with no assurance that any significant
number of consumers will pay to see it or hear it.
12. Financing

The relative importance of capital investment and operating costs
differ sharply among the industries. In professional sports, operating
costs for each season are large in comparison with upfront capital
costs. At the opposite end of the spectrum, capital costs dwarf
operating costs in the movie and popular music industries. Theatre
falls somewhere in between.
Theatre differs from professional sports, popular music, and
movies in that it receives most of its funding from subsidies or
98
charitable contributions.
13. Attitude toward collective bargaining

In most industries, employers fight ferociously to avoid
unionization and regulation of their workplaces through collective
bargaining. Unions fight equally ferociously to maintain unionization
and collective bargaining. In professional sports, employers want
collective bargaining to shield them from antitrust liability. The
employees sometimes oppose collective bargaining when they think
they can gain more from antitrust litigation.
In theatre, producers perceive that equity productions have
higher credibility, and that equity actors are better than non-equity

98. The non-profit theatre segment of the industry, comprising mainly off-Broadway
and regional theatres earned $811 million in revenue in 2009. VOGEL, supra note 1, at 497
n.7. Contributions exceeded revenue, comprising $969 million, or 54%. Id. Broadway
shows earned $939 million from Broadway productions in 2007, and $950 from road
shows, often performed by regional producers. Id. 482.
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actors. These perceptions mute the incentive to remain non-union for
cost and flexibility reasons.
14. Defining the boundary between product and labor markets

Any analysis of the interaction between antitrust and labor law
strains to distinguish product markets from labor markets. Antitrust
law focuses on product markets, while labor law focuses on labor
markets. But the two markets are intertwined. That is why it so
difficult to define the boundaries of the labor exemptions to the
antitrust laws. Labor costs must be reflected in the prices for
products and services, and so better employment terms tend to
reduce demand in product markets. Conversely, reduced revenues in
an employer’s product market diminish the resources available to
improve workplace conditions and employee compensation. So an
employer’s product market strategy legitimately is concerned with
labor market developments, while employees and their
representatives are legitimately concerned with product market
developments.
Analysis of the boundaries between the two markets must
consider issues such as:
1. Use of contracts rather than integration within the firm.
2. Continued employment versus project-by-project employment.
3. Horizontal interdependency—whether firm success depends on
interaction with competitors. (The Chicago Bears are more
profitable when they can play teams like the Green Bay Packers
but the attractiveness of Steppenwolf’s plays do not depend on
what Goodman is putting up).
4. Need for vertical integration: high in entertainment (Schubert;
CBS; CAMU; Paramount Pictures); low in sports.
5. Whether employees work at multiple levels: sports players also
functioning as coaches; actors directing plays or movies; writers
acting, directing, or producing.
6. Whether independent contractors are firms or individuals.
7. Sources of controversy.
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The reasons for friction between antitrust and labor law differs
between sports and other forms of entertainment. In sports,
producing a good product requires limits on competition so that the
best teams do not drive out the bad. Labor law is used essentially as a
shield for these limits, but it also comes into play because so much of
the competition between teams is driven by whom they have on their
rosters.
In music, theatre, and movies, the friction occurs because the
talent often performs entrepreneurial functions, and, conversely,
entrepreneurial activities represent competition to the labor market
for talent. It is difficult to say when a rock band is acting in its
business capacity and when the members are participating in a labor
market.
In low-budget moviemaking, the producer is often
indistinguishable from the director or cinematographer, who often
99
are the actors as well. As technology fuels the DIY phenomenon,
this conflation of roles becomes more prominent.
B. College sports—the enigma

College sports are an anomaly in the entertainment industry. Bigtime college football, for example, is nearly indistinguishable from
professional football. Revenue from broadcast of college games
rivals revenue from broadcast of NFL games. NFL teams recruit
almost exclusively from the ranks of college football players. Yet
college athletes are not considered employees, and therefore fall
completely outside the labor exemptions.
Nevertheless, tight
restrictions that the NCAA imposes on competition mostly have
escaped antitrust liability.
A number of commentators argue that college players should be
100
entitled to engage in collective bargaining. “The NCAA’s real role
is to oversee the collusion of university athletic departments, whose
goal is to maximize revenue and suppress the wages of its captive
101
labor force.” “Judicial opinions examining antitrust claims against

99. Do-It-Yourself.
100. See Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCornick, The Myth of the Student
Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASHINGTON L. REV. 71 (2006) (arguing
that college athletes are employees under traditional tests under NLRA); Rohith A.
Parasuraman, Unionizing Division I Athletics: A Viable Solution? 57 DUKE L.J. 727
(2007).
101. Joe Nocera, The College Sports Cartel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2011 at p.A21
(arguing in favor of an antitrust challenge to NCAA). See also Lawrence M. Kahn, Cartel
Behavior and Amateurism in College Sports, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 209, 211 (2007)
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NCAA rules are even more confused than decisions involving the
102
intraleague rules of professional leagues.”
103
In NCAA v. Board of Regents, analyzed more fully infra in
section III(A)(2), the Supreme Court found that the NCAA plays a
vital role in preserving the competitive character of college football,
104
broadening consumer choice and the options available to athletes.
Nevertheless, it found these pro-competitive effects insufficient under
the Sherman Act to offset the anti-competitive effects of NCAA rules
105
limiting television broadcasts of games.
Most of the antitrust challenges to NCAA restrictions have
foundered on the proposition, usually accepted by the courts, that
college athletics do not involve commercial product or labor markets.
In 2011, a district court dismissed an antitrust class action challenging
the NCAA’s bylaws prohibiting NCAA members from offering
multi-year athletic scholarships and imposing a cap on the number of
106
athletic-based discounts a school can offer per sport each year. The
107
district court relied on Banks v. NCAA, in which the Seventh
Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to grant the NCAA’s
motion to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint regarding the no-agent and
108
At issue in Banks were rules prohibiting college
no-draft rules.
athletes from participating in intercollegiate sports if they agreed to
be represented by an agent or asked to be placed on the draft list of a
109
The district court in Agnew found that the
professional league.
plaintiffs had adequately pleaded that the geographic market was the

(arguing that NCAA is a classic cartel, enforcing collusive restrictions on payments for
factors of production, including player compensation, on output, and on potential
competitors); Peter Kreher, Antitrust Theory, College Sports, and Interleague Rulemaking:
A New Critique of the NCAA’s Amateurism Rules, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 51 (2006)
(arguing that “NCAA’s amateurism rules, which prevent players from being paid and
impose restraints on their ability to move between schools, violate the antitrust laws
because they function as collusive agreements between competing college sports leagues
that limit consumer choice and lower product quality”); GET See also Robert Brown,
Research Note: Estimates of College Football Player Rents, 12 BROWN J. OF S.E. 200
(2011).
102. Kreher, supra note 101, at 67.
103. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
104. Id. at 101-02.
105. Id. at 103-04 (distinguishing per-se from rule-of-reason analysis).
106. Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMS-MJD, 2011 WL
3878200 (S.D. Ind. Sep. 1, 2011).
107. 977 F.2d 1081, 1085–86, 1094 (7th Cir.1992).
108. Id. at 1081.
109. Id. at 1083–84.
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entire United States, 110 but failed to plead relevant product markets.
The complaint alleged that two product markets were relevant: the
market for the sale of bachelor’s degrees and the labor market for the
111
purchase of student athlete services. The court rejected the labor
market allegation because Banks rejected the idea that NCAA
member schools could be purchasers of labor because the NCAA
eligibility and recruiting requirements prohibit member colleges from
112
engaging in price competition for players. It rejected the productmarket allegations because:
[P]eople cannot simply purchase bachelor’s degrees at
Division I colleges and universities. Notwithstanding pop
culture lyrics to the contrary, you can’t just mess around and
get a college degree. Instead, earning a bachelor’s degree
requires the student to attend class, take required courses, and
113
maintain certain grades, among many other things.
The conclusion with respect to the product market allegations is
plausible, but the conclusion with respect to the alleged labor market
is tautological. The reasoning would defeat any Sherman Act claim
in which a cartel is effective in prohibiting competition.
In Gaines v. NCAA, 114 the district court denied a preliminary
injunction against NCAA denial of eligibility to a former college
football player because he participated in the NFL draft. The court
held that the NCAA’s eligibility rules (as distinct from other NCAA
activities) were not subject to the antitrust laws because they were not
115
It also held that even if those NCAA
commercial activities.
activities were subject to antitrust scrutiny they would be privileged
under a rule of reason analysis because they have the socially
116
It
beneficial effect of preserving amateurism in college sports.
embraced the district court’s decision in Banks.
117
In Bassett v. NCAA, the Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a
Sherman Act claim by a former football coach who challenged

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Agnew, 2011 WL 3878200 at *6.
Id.
Id. at *7 (quoting Banks, 977 F.2d at 1091).
Id. at *8 [internal quotations and citations omitted].
746 F.Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
Id. at 744.
Id. at 746-47.
528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008).
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NCAA recruiting rules. The plaintiff coach alleged a group boycott
to prevent him from coaching at NCAA member schools: “The
restraint at issue here is NCAA’s boycott of coaches unjustly or
excessively punished because of its disciplinary system. These bans
affect interstate commerce by preventing schools across America
from hiring boycotted coaches to generate sports revenue and by
preventing these coaches from seeking gainful employment with
118
NCAA institutions.” The court began with the proposition that a
commercial activity must be implicated in order for the Sherman Act
119
to apply. “NCAA’s rules on recruiting student athletes, specifically
those rules prohibiting improper inducements and academic fraud,
are all explicitly non-commercial . . . and designed to promote and
120
ensure competitiveness amongst NCAA member schools.”
In in re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation, 121 a class
122
action later dismissed for failure to satisfy class-action standards,
the district court denied a motion to dismiss antitrust claims against
NCAA scholarship restrictions. The NCAA argued that the plaintiffs
“failed to allege a legally cognizable relevant market because there is
no ‘commercial’ or ‘employment market’ for the services of Division
I-A football players, and because Plaintiffs fail to define or identify
consumer substitutability, interchangeability, or cross-elasticity of
123
demand.”
The court reasoned:
By-law 15.5.5 does not clearly implicate student-athlete
eligibility in the same manner as rules requiring students to
attend class and rules revoking eligibility for entering a
professional draft. . . . [They] were developed to contain costs,
not to advance amateurism. Accordingly, the numerical
scholarship limitation at issue in this case is not on all fours

118. Id. at 431 (quoting plaintiff’s brief).
119. Id. at 433.
120. Id. at 433.
121. 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
122. In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., No. C04-1254C, 2006 WL
1207915 (W.D. Wash. May 3, 2006) (denying motion to certify class).
123. In re NCAA, 398 F. Supp. 2d. at 1150 (characterizing NCAA argument on motion
to dismiss).
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with those cases which hold that NCAA eligibility rules are
124
not subject to the Sherman Act.
It also found that the plaintiffs alleged a sufficient market, one in
which NCAA member schools compete for skilled amateur football
125
players as necessary inputs to the production of Division I football.
“The market alleged here is a monopsony. Injury to competition can
126
occur by monopsony just as it may result from monopoly.”
127
In Agnew v. NCAA, the Seventh Circuit also recognized
reality—a commercial labor market does exist for the services of
college athletes:
The proper identification of a labor market for studentathletes, on the other hand, would meet plaintiffs’ burden of
describing a cognizable market under the Sherman Act. As
an initial matter, labor markets are cognizable under the
Sherman Act. The Banks majority, in dicta, opined that the
market for scholarship athletes cannot be considered a labor
market, since schools do not engage in price competition for
players, nor does supply and demand determine the worth of
student-athletes’ labor. We find this argument unconvincing
for two reasons. First, the only reason that colleges do not
engage in price competition for student-athletes is that other
NCAA bylaws prevent them from doing so. The fact that
certain procompetitive, legitimate trade restrictions exist in a
given industry does not remove that industry from the
purview of the Sherman Act altogether. Rather, all NCAA
actions that are facially anticompetitive must have
procompetitive justifications supporting their existence.
Second, colleges do, in fact, compete for student-athletes,
though the price they pay involves in-kind benefits as opposed
to cash. For instance, colleges may compete to hire the coach
that will be best able to launch players from the NCAA to the
National Football League, an attractive component for a
prospective college football player. Colleges also engage in
veritable arms races to provide top-of-the-line training
124. Id. at 1149-1150.
125. Id. at 1150 [internal quotations and citations omitted].
126. Id. at 1151.
127. 683 F.3d 328, 348 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of Sherman Act suit
challenging limitation on athletic scholarships)
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facilities which, in turn, are supposed to attract collegiate
athletes. Many future student-athletes also look to the
strength of a college’s academic programs in deciding where
to attend. These are all part of the competitive market to
attract student-athletes whose athletic labor can result in
128
many benefits for a college, including economic gain.
It affirmed dismissal of a Sherman Act complaint, however,
challenging NCAA restrictions on athletic scholarships, which it
found not clearly pro-competitive, unlike NCAA eligibility
restrictions. The plaintiffs had unaccountably failed to allege
existence of the market.
Although universities hate the idea of collective bargaining for
their athletes because it would increase costs and diminish control,
ironically it would offer them broader protection against antitrust
liability.

IV. Analytical approach
A. Antitrust generally
1.

The antitrust laws

The goal of antitrust law is to enhance consumer welfare by
129
ensuring that competition regulates markets:
The Sherman Act. . . rests on the premise that the
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices,
the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at
the same time providing an environment conducive to the
preservation of our democratic political and social
130
institutions.

128. Id. at 346 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
129. Compare MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.3d 1081,
1113 (7th Cir. 1983) (“antitrust laws are designed to encourage vigorous competition, as
well as to promote economic efficiency and maximize consumer welfare”) with ROBERT
H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 7, 9 (1978)
(arguing that antitrust’s basic premises are mutually incompatible because some of its
doctrines preserve competition, while others suppress it).
130. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 n.27 (quoting Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958)).

130

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[35:1

The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits horizontal agreements
(agreements among competitors) that restrain trade and more
narrowly prohibits unilateral action that threatens monopolization.
131
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts that restrain trade
132
or commerce. Section 2 prohibits monopolization of trade or
commerce. The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination
likely to lessen competition unless price differences are justified by
133
differing costs. The Clayton Act prohibits acquisition of another
enterprise when it may “substantially” lessen competition or tend to
134
create a monopoly. Labor organizations and their “lawful” conduct
in carrying out their “legitimate objects” are immunized from these
135
prohibitions.
Section one treats concerted activity more strictly than section
two treats unilateral activity because concerted activity deprives the
marketplace of independent centers of decision-making. Restricting
136
it leaves untouched vast arenas for private economic decisions. In
the years after enactment of the Sherman Act in 1884, judicial
decisions interpreting the law drew distinctions between agreements
among competitors (“horizontal agreements”) and agreements
among firms providing inputs and consuming outputs of either other’s
production activities (“vertical agreements”). Those concessions
crafted two tests for determining illegality under the Act: a per se test
for the most egregious restraints such as naked price fixing or output
restrictions, and a more flexible rule of reason test for agreements
that have both anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects.
Monopolization is different from market dominance. “Simply
possessing monopoly power and charging monopoly prices does not
violate § 2; rather, the statute targets the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business
137
acumen, or historic accident.” In another case, the Court stated:

131. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
133. 15 U.S.C.§ 13 (2006) (derived from § 1 of Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006) (derived from § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914)).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006) (§ 6 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731).
136. Am. Needle, 130 S.Ct. at 2201 (holding that National Football League was not a
single entity and that agreements among teams to restrict distribution of sports
paraphernalia violated section 1) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
137. Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448 (2009)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
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“The law directs itself not against conduct which is
competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which
unfairly tends to destroy competition itself. It does so not out
of solicitude for private concerns but out of concern for the
public interest. Thus, this Court and other courts have been
careful to avoid constructions of § 2 which might chill
competition, rather than foster it. It is sometimes difficult to
distinguish robust competition from conduct with long-term
anticompetitive effects; moreover, single-firm activity is
unlike concerted activity covered by § 1, which inherently is
fraught with anticompetitive risk. For these reasons, § 2
makes the conduct of a single firm unlawful only when it
actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do so, . . .
[necessitating] inquiry into the relevant product and
geographic market and the defendant’s economic power in
138
that market.
2.

Rule of reason

Even if a labor exemption does not apply, the restrictions on
competition nevertheless may be justified under rule-of-reason
analysis. When anti-competitive measures involve an industry in
which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product
is to be available at all, careful definition of relevant markets and
analysis of the dynamics in those markets is necessary under the rule
139
of reason.
The rule of reason recognizes that “a restraint in a limited aspect
140
of a market may actually enhance marketwide competition.” Both
the per se rule and the rule of reason are employed “to form a
141
judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint.” In
142
NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, the
Supreme Court observed that the antitrust laws prohibit only
unreasonable restraints of trade, since “every contract is a restraint of
143
trade.” Although horizontal price fixing and restraints on output,

138. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1993).
139. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 85 (1984) (rejecting per se treatment of horizontal price
fixing in market for college football game broadcasts, but finding that anti-competitive
effects outweighed pro-competitive effects).
140. Id. at 103.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 85.
143. Id. at 98.
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such as those contained in the plan, typically are unreasonable as a
matter of law, under the per-se approach, the Court found that rule of
reason rather than per se analysis was appropriate because collegiate
football is “an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition
144
are essential if the product is to be available at all.” Also, the Court
stated:
The NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college football to
preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be
marketed which might otherwise be unavailable.
In
performing this role, its actions widen consumer choice—not
only the choices available to sports fans but also those
available to athletes—and hence can be viewed as pro145
competitive.
Because the NCAA television plan on its face restrained the
operation of a free market, the antitrust defendants had the burden of
146
The majority found
establishing a pro-competitive justification.
that no pro-competitive efficiencies existed to justify the restrictions;
NCAA football could be marketed just as efficiently without the
147
television plan. Nor was the plan necessary to enable the NCAA to
penetrate the market, because college football broadcasts “constitute
148
a unique product for which there is no ready substitute.” Nor did it
149
effectively protect the market for attendance at live football games.
Significantly, it held that “The rule of reason does not support a
defense based on the assumption that competition itself is
150
unreasonable.” The Court reasoned:
The NCAA’s argument that its television plan is necessary
to protect live attendance is not based on a desire to
maintain the integrity of college football as a distinct and
attractive product, but rather on a fear that the product will
not prove sufficiently attractive to draw live attendance
when faced with competition from televised games. At

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 100.
Id. at 101-02 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Id. at 113.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 115-116.
Id. at 117 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
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bottom the NCAA’s position is that ticket sales for most
college games are unable to compete in a free market. The
television plan protects ticket sales by limiting output—just
as any monopolist increases revenues by reducing output.
By seeking to insulate live ticket sales from the full
spectrum of competition because of its assumption that the
product itself is insufficiently attractive to consumers,
petitioner forwards a justification that is inconsistent with
151
the basic policy of the Sherman Act.
The Court recognized pro-competitive legitimacy of the goal of
maintaining a competitive balance among amateur athletic teams, but
152
found that the plan did not promote that goal.
The dissenters 153 questioned the majority’s assessment of anti154
competitive effect and argued that the plan’s positive effect on the
NCAA’s fundamental goal of preserving amateurism and integrating
155
athletic and education were “sufficient to offset any minimal
156
anticompetitive effects . . . .”
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.157
also illustrates rule of reason analysis, but it came out the other way,
validating a collective licensing system for musical works. The court
of appeals, disagreeing with the district court, held that the blanket
licenses, which uniformly charged fees based on a percentage of total
revenue or a flat fee, constituted price fixing, a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding per se
treatment inappropriate, in significant part because the courts lacked
158
It
experience with arrangements of the sort being challenged.
found pro-competitive effects because of the impracticability of direct
licensing by thousands of copyright owners, thousands of users, and
millions of compositions. The costs would be prohibitive without
blanket licenses. Furthermore, the challenged arrangement was not a
naked restraint of trade; it was accompanied by “the integration of

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 117-18.
Id. at 120 (White, Rehnquist, JJ, dissenting).
Id. at 130-31.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 136.
441 U.S. 1 (1979).
Id. at 10.
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sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright
159
use.”
Justice Stevens agreed that rule-of-reason analysis was
appropriate rather than per se illegality, but he dissented on the
160
outcome of the majority’s rule of reason analysis. He noted that a
practice that might be permissible for a small vendor may become
illegal when employed by a dominant firm because of its greater
161
impact on competition in the latter case. He concluded that the
anti-competitive effects of the challenged arrangement outweighed its
pro-competitive benefits. His conclusion rested in large part on
identifying less anti-competitive alternatives such as negotiation of
music-performing rights on a per-composition or per-use basis, either
with the composer or publisher directly or with an agent such as
162
ASCAP.”
He cautioned that antitrust policy requires close scrutiny of great
aggregations of economic power, especially when the aggregation is
163
based on statutory monopolies such as copyright. That, of course, is
precisely the starting point for many of the restrictions on
competition in entertainment markets.
B. Labor law
1.

Collective bargaining

Collective bargaining is intended to result in private agreements
to restrain competition in labor markets. The most traditional trade
union objective is to restrict the supply of labor—to establish a
164
Union security clauses such as
monopoly in the labor market.
closed-shop agreements and union-shop agreements are means used
to achieve that objective with respect to the employer covered by the
agreement: that employer cannot employ anyone who is not already a
member of the union (a closed shop agreement), or anyone hired by
the employer must become and remain a member of the union as a
condition of continued employment (a union shop agreement).

159. Id. at 20.
160. Id. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 29-30.
162. Id. at 33.
163. Id. at 38.
164. See Campbell, supra note 6, at 1012 (explaining legitimacy of creating a
monopoly of labor supply).
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These clauses give the union a monopoly on the labor supply for that
165
particular employer.
Almost as common an objective in a traditional unionized
industry is the objective of restricting the demand for labor—to
166
The union
establish a monopsony in the relevant labor market.
ensures that no employer will employ any worker who is not
represented by the union—or, to divorce the monopsony concept
from the monopoly concept—to ensure that no employer employs
anyone under terms less favorable than the union-negotiated terms.
At the pole, a union may seek the establishment of a product
market cartel with input restrictions, so that the product markets for
167
unionized employers are protected from non-union competition.
A variety of means can be used to pursue these objectives. The
union can withdraw labor (a strike); it can publicize the conduct of a
168
recalcitrant employer by picketing and/or other forms of publicity,
it can cause other firms that supply factors of production or that
169
The
purchase products or services to withhold their patronage.
availability of all of these means depends on the union having a
beachhead from which to extend the pressure: a group of employees
already represented by the union who have enough solidarity to make
the sacrifice in wages involved in a strike or to incur the opportunity
cost and other costs of picketing or publicizing a dispute.
2.

Economic weapons

Negotiation involves leverage. Rational negotiators accept any
negotiated solution that is better than their best alternative to a
170
Various weapons exist to
negotiated agreement (BATNA).
influence an adversary’s BATNA. In traditional collective bargaining

165. The agreement may cover only certain crafts or classes of work, in which case the
agreement gives the union a monopoly on the supply of that particular kind of labor.
166. Cf. Campbell, supra note 6, at 2022, 1040 (recognizing legitimacy of union efforts
to seek anti-competitive arrangements to assure demand for labor).
167. See id. at 1047 (noting labor law’s suspicion of union efforts to help create
product market cartels, even though it helps protect union standards).
168. See, e.g. Area standards picketing, privileged by 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (2006).
169. This is a secondary boycott, restricted by 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4).
170. See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 837 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (S.D. Cal.
2011), (characterizing BATNA theory as well-accepted); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. Negotiated
Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the
Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L. J. 1625, 1637 (1986) (explaining
BATNA concept).
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the paradigm is a strike, a lockout, or unilateral imposition by the
employer of new terms and conditions of employment.
171
In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the Supreme Court held that
unilateral imposition of a fixed salary for developmental football
players after an impasse in collective bargaining fell within the nonstatutory labor exemption. The Court considered the issue to be
whether the exemption “appl[ies] to an agreement among several
employers bargaining together to implement after impasse the terms
172
of their last best good-faith wage offer.” It noted that unilateral
implementation of proposed terms of employment after an impasse in
multi-employer bargaining was a “familiar practice” in multi173
employer bargaining, as well as in single employer bargaining. It
174
concluded that the non-statutory exemption applied.
A more recent case, probably decided incorrectly, is California ex
175
rel Harris v. Safeway, Inc. It involved a mutual strike assistance
agreement (the “RSP”) among California grocery-store chains.
Under the agreement, any grocer that earned revenues above its
historical share relative to the other chains during strike or lockout
period would pay fifteen percent of those excess revenues as
reimbursement to the other grocers to restore their pre-strike
176
shares. The agreement was intended to ameliorate the effects of a
selective strike, also known as “whipsawing.” The grocers argued that
the non-statutory exemption immunizes employers’ agreements
related in time and circumstance to the collective-bargaining process,
and that the economic weapons parties use to advance their positions
in a labor dispute—like an agreement to share revenue to weaken the
effects of a whipsaw strike—are ‘as much a part of the collective
177
bargaining process as are negotiations over terms.’” The en banc
court of appeals rejected the argument, finding no body of regulatory
or judicial decisions that establishes employer revenue sharing as an
178
“an accepted economic weapon during a labor dispute.” The court
also noted that the challenged agreement primarily affected the
product market, while most of the non-statutory labor exemption
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

518 U.S. 231 (1996).
Id. at 238.
Id. at 239-240.
Id. at 250.
651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011)
Id. at 1123.
Id. at 1128 (summarizing employer position).
Id. at 1129.
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cases involved employer activity primarily directed at the labor
179
market.
The decision is wrong because the mutual assistance pact
concerned collective bargaining; its only purpose was to enhance
employer bargaining power by reducing the injury that could be
inflicted by a strike or lockout. The dissent pointed to a number of
NLRB and court cases validating a variety of economic weapons to
combat whipsaw strike tactics: strike insurance provided by unions,
employer strike insurance plans, and, in Air Line Pilots Ass’n
180
International v. Civil Aeronautics Board., an employer mutual aid
pact containing a provision “almost identical to the RSP” at issue in
181
the Harris case.
In Air Line Pilots Ass’n International, 182 cited by dissenting circuit
judge Kozinski in Harris, airline unions challenged the Civil
Aeronautics Board approval of a mutual aid pact entered into by
airlines. The pact provided for strike payments. A strikebound
company received payments from other pact members equal to their
increase in revenues resulting from the strike minus their added
183
operating expenses in servicing the new business. Upholding the
pact, the court reasoned that “[t]he national labor policy rests on the
principle that parties should be free to marshal the economic
resources at their disposal in the resolution of a labor dispute,
consistent with the specific rights and prohibitions established by the
184
labor statutes.” It aligned itself with the Second Circuit, which, in
185
Kennedy v. Long Island Railroad Co., approved an employer strike
186
insurance plan in the railroad industry.
3.

The labor exemptions to the antitrust laws—in general

Much of the history of collective bargaining in professional
football was shaped by the statutory and non-statutory exemptions to
the antitrust laws. These exemptions similarly determine the scope of

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 1131.
502 F.2d 453 (D.C.Cir.1974)
Harris, 651 F.3d. at *17, *19 (Kozinski, C.J. dissenting).
Air Line Pilots, 502 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 456.
Id.
319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1963),
Id. at 374.
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permissible workplace regulations in all sectors of the entertainment
industry.
4.

The labor laws

The labor laws comprise the Norris-LaGuardia Act; 187 which
divests federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in “labor
188
disputes;” the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”); The Labor
189
190
Management Relations Act; and the Railway Labor Act. Section
191
192
7 of the NLRA and section 2 of the Railway Labor Act grant
broad rights to employees to engage in collective bargaining through
representatives of their choice. Means and ends in collective
bargaining are not unlimited in scope, however. Labor law restricts
193
use of these weapons, but only when they are used by union actors.
A number of other statutes regulate aspects of the employment
relationship, but the ones named here provide the basic statutory
framework for collective bargaining, which is the core of the labor
exemption.
5.

Statutory exemption

A “statutory” labor exemption, derived from the Clayton Act and
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, shields labor unions from antitrust
194
Without the exemption, labor unions would be a
liability.
paradigmatic combination to fix wages. When labor unions enter into
agreements with others such as employers, however, they are outside
195
the statutory exemption.

187. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (2006).
188. Id. at §§ 151-169 (2006).
189. Id. at §§ 171-183 (2006).
190. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2006).
191. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
192. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2006).
193. The chapeau to 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(b) says, “(b) Unfair labor practices by labor
organization.
“It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—”
194. H. A. Artists & Associates, Inc. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704, 715
(1981).
195. Id.
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Non-statutory exemption

Agreements among businessmen are subject to the antitrust laws.
196
Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton involved a suit for an
injunction brought by a fish-packing enterprise, claiming that the
defendants violated the Sherman Act. The defendant, styling itself
the “Pacific Coast Fishermen’s Union,” actually was a fishermen’s
association. The fishermen owned or leased fishing boats, and carried
197
on their business as independent entrepreneurs. The “union” acted
as an agent for sale of fish caught by its members. It prohibited
members from selling fish outside of the agreement, and prohibited
198
purchasers from purchasing fish from nonmembers.
The court of appeals, reversing the district court, held that the
Norris-LaGuardia act foreclosed an injunction, because a labor
dispute was involved. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that
“a dispute among businessmen over the terms of a contract for the
sale of fish” is different from “controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association of persons
199
The
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment.”
Norris-LaGuardia Act applies, the Court held, only when “the
200
employer-employee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy.”
The Court Reasoned
The controversy here is altogether between fish sellers and
fish buyers. The sellers are not employees of the petitioners
or of any other employer nor do they seek to be. On the
contrary, their desire is to continue to operate as independent
businessmen, free from such controls as an employer might
201
exercise.
Nevertheless, union agreements with non-union parties may be
within a “nonstatutory” exemption if the agreement is “intimately
related to the union’s vital concerns of wages, hours, and working
202
conditions.” The non-statutory exemption is necessary because the

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

315 U.S. 143 (1942).
Id. at 144-45.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id.at 147.
H. A. Artists & Associates, 451 U.S. at 716.
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statutory exemption does not exempt concerted action by non-labor
203
parties or agreements between labor unions and non-labor parties.
The early cases recognized this non-statutory exemption but
found it to be inapplicable.
The Supreme Court has never delineated the precise
boundaries of the [non-statutory labor] exemption, and what
guidance it has given as to its application has come mostly in
cases in which agreements between an employer and a labor
union were alleged to have injured or eliminated a competitor
204
in the employer’s business or product market.
The Court first addressed the non-statutory labor exemption in
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3 International Brotherhood of
205
Electrical Workers, involving a series of agreements between an
electrical workers union and several manufacturers and contractors,
in which the manufacturers and contractors agreed not to do business
with non-union firms. Congress did not intend to bestow on unions
“complete and unreviewable authority to aid business groups to
206
frustrate [antitrust legislation’s] primary objective.”
In United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington 207 the Supreme
Court similarly declined to apply the exemption to insulate a wage
agreement between a union of mine workers and large coal
companies. There were, the Court explained, “limits to what a union
208
or an employer may offer or extract in the name of wages.”
Measures adopted with the purpose of eliminating smaller coal
companies and permitting larger companies to control the market
209
were outside those limits. “[A] union forfeits its exemption from
the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it has agreed with one
set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining
210
The Court held that the challenged agreement was not
units.”
211
exempt from the antitrust laws.

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Harris, 651 F.3d at *3 fn 19.
Id..
325 U.S. 797 (1945).
Id at 810.
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
Id. at 665.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 669.
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The leading early case finding that conduct fell within the
exemption is Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters &
212
Butcher Workmen of North America v. Jewel Tea Co. The union
representing butchers in Chicago reached a collective-bargaining
agreement with a multi-employer bargaining unit of food retailers
that included a marketing hours restriction, which prohibited the sale
213
of meat before nine a.m. and after six p.m., and on Sundays. The
plurality opinion explained that “the marketing-hours restriction, like
wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately related to wages, hours and
working conditions that the unions’ successful attempt to obtain that
provision . . . falls within the protection of the national labor policy
214
and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act.”
The basic outlines of the non-statutory exemption were visible in
these early cases: direct restrictions on product markets lay outside
the exemption; indirect effects on product markets from terms closely
related to wages and working conditions lay within the exemption.
The term “nonstatutory” was first used by the Supreme Court in
Connell Consruction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local
215
Union No. 100. In that case, the Court declined to apply the non216
statutory exemption to a union-employer agreement. A building
trades union entered into a multi-employer bargaining agreement
217
The union asked
with a large group of mechanical contractors.
Connell Construction—a general building contractor that was outside
the bargaining agreement and whose workers were not represented
by the union—to agree to subcontract mechanical work only to firms
218
covered by the multiemployer agreement. Connell initially refused
to sign the agreement but acquiesced when the unions picketed one
219
The exemption did not shield the
of its construction sites.
agreement from the antitrust laws because such a “direct restraint on
the business market has substantial anticompetitive effects, both

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

381 U.S. 676 (1965).
Id. at 679–80
Id. at 689–90.
421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975) (using term “nonstatutory exemption).
Id. at 621.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 620.
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actual and potential, that would not follow naturally from the
220
elimination of competition over wages and working conditions.”
In separate opinions, Circuit Judge Harry Edwards said this about
the non-statutory exemption:
[O]ne principle that seems clear: restraints on competition
lawfully imposed through the collective bargaining process are
exempted from antitrust liability so long as such restraints
primarily affect only the labor market organized around the
221
collective bargaining relationship.
….
[T]here may be a ‘labor dispute’ where the disputants do not
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
But the statutory classification, however broad, of parties and
circumstances to which a ‘labor dispute’ may relate does not
expand the application of the Act to include controversies
upon which the employer-employee relationship has no
222
bearing.
7.

Congruence of labor exemption with scope of NLRA and NorrisLaGuardia

The scope of a labor dispute under Norris-LaGuardia has the
same boundaries as the labor exemption because the labor exemption
223
Likewise, the labor exemption
is based on Norris-LaGuardia.
should have the same boundaries as employee status under the
NLRA, because otherwise the employees do not have the right to
engage in collective bargaining. Promotion of collective bargaining is
the labor policy that trumps antitrust policy.

220. Id. at 625. The analysis of Connell follows the court’s summary in Harris, 651 F.3d
at 1118 (reviewing history of non-labor exemption). Professor Campbell argues that
Connell was correctly decided because the union focused on product market effect.
Campbell, supra note 6, at 1060 (noting inconsistency between tests used in Jewel Tea and
Connell).
221. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 518 U.S.
231 (1996).
222. Conley Motor Express v. Russell, 500 F.2d 124, 126 (3d Cir. 1974).
223. See Carroll v. American Fed’n of Musicians, 241 F. Supp. 865, 891-92 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (suggesting that scope of labor exemption is same as scope of “labor dispute” under
Norris-LaGuardia). The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the district court’s
analysis. American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
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Judge Edwards derived two principles from the decided cases:
First, the exemption must be broad enough in scope to shield
the entire collective bargaining process established by federal
law. Second, the case for applying the exemption is strongest
where a restraint on competition operates primarily in the
labor market and has no anti-competitive effect on the
224
product market.
There is no collective bargaining process to shield if the workers
involved in a dispute are not statutory “employees” entitled to
participate.
Nevertheless, there may be some statutory nonemployees who are so closely tied to a labor market in which
collective bargaining operates that restrictions on their competition
225
may be within the exemption.
[N]ot all combinations of unions with entrepreneurs or
independent contractors fall outside the statutory exemption.
The second part of the Hutcheson requirement of unilateral
conduct authorizes a broad interpretation of “labor group.”
Even though a challenged combination includes independent
contractors or entrepreneurs, it may come within the statutory
exemption if the non-employee parties to the combination are
in job or wage competition with the employee parties, or in
some other economic interrelationship that substantially
226
affects the legitimate interests of the employees.
There must be some statutory employees involved, however.
We recognize, of course, that, as a general matter, the
antitrust laws may apply to restraints on competition in nonunionized labor markets. However, we think the inception of
a collective bargaining relationship between employees and
employers irrevocably alters the governing legal regime.
Once employees organize a union, federal labor law
necessarily limits the rights of individual employees to enter
into negotiations with their employer. Indeed, employers are
positively prohibited from seeking to bargain with individual

224. Brown, 50 F.3d at 1051.
225. See § 2.4[D].
226. Home Box Office, 531 F. Supp. at 589.
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employees, absent consent from the union. Moreover,
employers may lawfully reduce competition in the labor
market by forming multi-employer bargaining units, allowing
for standardization of wage rates and working conditions
within an industry. Thus, once collective bargaining begins,
the Sherman Act paradigm of a perfectly competitive market
necessarily is replaced by the NLRA paradigm of organized
negotiation—a paradigm that itself contemplates collusive
activity on the parts of both employees and employers.
Stubborn adherence to antitrust principles in such a market
can only result in “a wholesale subversion” of federal labor
227
policy.
In Brady v. NFL, 228 however, the court of appeals accepted the
parties’ stipulation that “the Act’s restrictions on equitable relief are
not necessarily coextensive with the substantive rules of antitrust
229
It held that a “labor dispute” may exist under Norrislaw. . .”
230
Rejecting the plaintiffs’
LaGuardia even if no union exists.
argument that the Act only prohibits injunctions against unions and
employees, it also held that a lockout is covered by the specific
231
activities shielded from injunctions by the Act.
When either labor exemption applies, it is likely that the NLRB
has primary jurisdiction, displacing the authority of the courts, to
decide the merits of any dispute over interpretation of the labor
232
laws.
8.

Means and ends

The extent of the labor exemptions depends on the objectives
(ends) of the challenged arrangement and the means used to achieve
them. The Clayton Act refers to lawful means to achieve legitimate
233
objectives in taking collective bargaining outside the scope of
antitrust law.
Analysis of these factors frequently overlaps

227. Brown, 50 F.3d at 1054-1055 [internal quotations and citations omitted].
228. 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011).
229. Id. at 682, citing Burlington Northern, 481 U.S. at 435 n.3.
230. Id. at 673.
231. Id. at 680-681.
232. When the NLRB has jurisdiction, it enjoys primary jurisdiction, subject only to
narrow judicial review. McDermott v. Amersand Pub., LLC, 593 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir.
2010) (finding broader scope for judicial inquiry when NLRB seeks injunction).
233. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006).
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assessment of the anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects in
antitrust rule-of-reason analysis.
9.

Coverage of independent contractors

The general view is that independent contractors may not benefit
from the labor exemption by banding together and calling themselves
234
a labor union. In Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh
235
Plate Glass Co., the Supreme Court reviewed the evolution of the
statutory definition of employee, noting that Congress had amended
the statute explicitly to exclude “independent contractors,” after the
236
Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, agreed with the
237
NLRB that newspaper street vendors were statutory employees.
The prohibition is not absolute, however:
Even though a challenged combination includes independent
contractors or entrepreneurs, it may come within the statutory
exemption if the non-employee parties to the combination are
in job or wage competition with the employee parties, or in
some other economic interrelationship that substantially
238
affects the legitimate interests of the employees.
In Taylor v. Journeymen Horseshoers, 239 the en banc Fourth
Circuit, relying heavily on Columbia River Packers, reversed the
district court and held that farriers (workers that shoe horses) were
independent contractors and therefore outside the labor exemption.
The case arose when a union representing Maryland farriers insisted
that trainers and owners of race horses use only union farriers and
further threatened to expel any union member who worked for less
than union scale. The court of appeals found that the non-union
farriers were independent contractors because they set their own
working hours, because they worked for more than one trainer and

234. Los Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94,
102-03 (1962) (holding that independent grease peddlers not immune from antitrust
injunction requiring them to disband); Columbia River Packers, 315 U.S. at 147 (holding
that association of independent fisherman who wanted to fix prices were not covered by
labor exemption).
235. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
236. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
237. 404 U.S. at 167.
238. Home Box Office, 531 F. Supp. at 589.
239. 353 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1965).

146

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[35:1

owner, and because the trainers and owners did not concern
themselves with how the task of shoeing a horse was accomplished
240
but only with the end result.
Their status as independent
contractors led to the conclusion that no labor dispute was involved,
and therefore that the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the labor
exemption did not foreclose an injunction against the violation of the
Sherman Act:
The only interests sought to be advanced by the activities of
these defendants are the interests of those independent
horseshoers who render services to trainers and owners for a
certain fee, unilaterally fixed, per horse.
They are
independent businessman, specialists in their line, who have
banded together and who act in concert for their mutual
benefit and improvement. We fail to discover the existence of
any employer-employee relationship which is the ‘Matrix’ of
this controversy or any condition which, under the provisions
of either the Clayton Act or the Norris-LaGuardia Act, would
241
protect the activities of the defendants.
Circuit judges Sobeloff and Bell dissented:
The dispute between the farriers and the owners concerns the
reward paid the farriers for their labor. The refusal to handle
the Canadians’ horses grows out of the latter’s use of labor
which undercut wage standards the union deemed fair. The
defendants’ conduct involves nothing more than the
withholding of their labor in order to coerce the owners to
have all work performed under minimum union standards.
Such a withholding of labor does not violate the antitrust
242
laws.
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild, 243 holding the free-lance
directors were employees, discussed infra in this section,
distinguished Taylor.
When no labor union and no statutory employees are involved at
all, the non-statutory exemption is unavailable. Conley Motor
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 597-98.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 607-8.
531 F. Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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Express, Inc. v. Russell, 244 involved an association of owner-operator
truck drivers that had been denied status as a labor union by the
NLRB. The association picketed a trucking company that employed
its members, seeking recognition as bargaining agent and obtained a
more favorable financial arrangement. The existing arrangement
paid the drivers a share of the fee that the trucking company received
245
The trucking company’s legal theory was
for hauling steel.
violation of the antitrust laws, a position that the truckers did not
contest. They argued that they were shielded from injunctive relief
246
The court of appeals affirmed grant of a
by Norris-LaGuardia.
preliminary injunction against the picketing, finding that the primary
prerequisite for exemption from the anti-trust laws was lacking, “i.e.,
that their dispute with Conley involves an employer-employee
247
relationship.”
Whether someone performing work is an employee or
independent contractor is determined under the general common law
of agency, which requires evaluation of the hiring party’s right to
control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished,
which involves analysis of the following factors:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

248

The skill required;
The source of the instrumentalities and tools; 249
The location of the work; 250
The duration of the relationship between the parties; 251
Whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional
252
projects to the hired party;
6. The extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long
253
to work;

244. 500 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1974).
245. Id. at 125.
246. Id. at 125-26 (summarizing positions of parties).
247. Id. at 126.
248. Lower-skilled workers are more likely to be employees.
249. If the worker provides his own tools, he is more likely to be an independent
contractor.
250. If work is performed only at the hiring party’s facilities, the worker is more likely
to be an employee.
251. The longer the relationship, the more likely is employee status.
252. If the hiring party does have the right to assign, employee status is more likely.
253. If the worker defines the times and durations, he is more likely to be an
independent contractor; if he punches a time clock, he is more likely to be an employee.
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7. The method of payment; 254
8. The hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; 255
9. Whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring
256
party; consider using bullet points
10. Whether the hired party is in business; 257
11. The provision of employee benefits; 258 and
12. The tax treatment of the hired party. 259
260

In Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild of America, Inc.,
HBO filed an antitrust action against an association of freelance
directors. The directors defended based on the labor exemption. The
district court decided that the statutory exemption applied. Its
reasoning is especially pertinent to the subject of this article, because
it emphasizes a trend of shifting work from traditional employees to
freelance workers:
Several characteristics of freelance directors’ activities tend to
suggest that they are independent contractors in the sale of
their services. Freelance directors may accept or reject offers
to direct particular shows. They usually contract to work on
an individual program rather than for a fixed period. Under
Guild agreements, they are paid flat fees for work up to a
certain number of days and may accept more than one
assignment simultaneously from different employers. They
have considerable discretion over who will serve as their
assistants, particularly the associate director and technical
crew; often these assistants work repeatedly with the same
director. Freelance directors also have special skills, based on
substantial training and experience. They necessarily have
considerable discretion in exercising their skills, working

254. Periodic payment by the hour, week, month, or year makes employee status more
likely. Payment by project makes independent contractor status more likely.
255. If the worker hires her own assistants and pays them directly, she is more likely to
be an independent contractor.
256. If it is part of her regular business, then employee status is more likely.
257. If the hired party is in business, independent contractor status is more likely.
258. Payment of benefits, such as health care insurance and pension benefits, makes
employee status more likely.
259. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989)
(applying common-law test in copyright case; citing Restatement of Agency § 220(2)).
260. 531 F. Supp. 578, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
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closely with all the talent associated with a show, contributing
creatively to all the elements of a show, and working to mold
those elements into a coherent whole that has the “look”
sought by the individual in charge of the production. A
producer may specify the desired result, but the director
261
usually decides initially how that result is to be achieved.
Nevertheless, the court identified other characteristics of the
labor market that suggested treatment as employees: freelance
directors risked no monetary capital in shows and did not share in any
profits. They did not get paid for a defined output, instead receiving
additional compensation for each additional day of work,
reimbursement for their expenses, and fringe benefits. Many were
treated as employees for tax purposes. They did not control either
262
the time or place of their work.
These characteristics combined to drive the outcome of
application of the right-to-control test:
“Freelance directors have no ‘“right to control’” the creative
elements of shows they direct. Guild agreements expressly
reserve to employers the power to supervise and control
freelance directors. Producers have complete discretion in
determining what revisions, deletions, or abridgements to
make on directors’ work product . . . Where directors are left
with substantial control and creative authority, it is because
producers decide that such a policy is appropriate for the
show involved or necessary to accommodate a particularly
powerful director. Even famous, award-winning directors,
however, are often closely supervised by their producers....
Thus, although freelance directors may independently
contract for their work, once engaged they perform their
263
tasks, albeit with skill and creativity, as employees.
“* * *
Relevant to the theme of this article, the court found:

261. Id. at 594.
262. Id. at 594-95.
263. Id.
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The trend to freelance status for directors has not been the
result solely of a desire by directors for greater creative
independence. Rather, it is the product of many forces, and
particularly . . . pressures to surrender control over
programming, pressures that have led to the establishment of
numerous independent production companies. These smaller
entities have less need and capacity to retain full-time staff
directors. Furthermore, the need for directorial services was
reduced in all production entities by the advent of tape and
other filming techniques; live television programming, which
created a great need for directorial services, has now been
substantially abandoned in many areas. The networks and
production companies have retained full-time staff directors
chiefly to work on programs produced on a regular basis, and
they have reduced the number of such directors in large part
264
because they need fewer full-timers.
Even if the directors were not employees,
[T]he similarity of functions and overlap of capacities among
staff and freelance directors creates a mutuality of interest
that readily justifies their bargaining collectively. If minimum
wages or other conditions of employment differed materially
for these two groups, the terms of employment enjoyed by the
more advantaged group could well be affected by the
availability of directorial services in the other group at lower
prices. Staff and freelance directors are to a considerable
extent interchangeable; indeed, employer decisions more than
anything else determine throughout the industry whether a set
of directors is staff or freelance. Thus, staff and freelance
directors are in much stronger job competition than were the
musicians and bandleaders in American Federation of
Musicians v. Carroll, supra, which permitted a bargaining
265
combination of the two groups.”
In Julien v. Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers, Inc., 266
the district court determined that stage directors were entitled to

264. Id. at 596.
265. Id. at 595 -97 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
266. No. 68 Civ. 5120, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15839, (S.D.N.Y. Oct 7, 1975).
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labor exemption because they were employees. The producer
exercised control over every aspect of work. One with experience in
theatre might dispute the general validity of this assertion. In many
productions, the director is the boss.
267
In Ring v. Spina, the court determined that playwrights were
not entitled to the labor exemption:
Here not only are the disputing parties not in an employeremployee relationship, but, unlike the Allen Bradley case, the
controversy cannot concern itself with conditions of
employment, since none of the parties affected are in any true
sense employees. An author writing a book or play is usually
not then even in any contractual relation with his producer. If
and when he does contract, he does not continue in the
producer’s service to any appreciable or continuous extent
thereafter. Normally the author appears more nearly like the
fishermen entrepreneurs of the Hinton case or the doctors in
the American Medical Association case than workmen banded
together in a union. The minimum price and royalties
provided by the Basic Agreement, unlike minimum wages in a
collective bargaining agreement, are not remuneration for
continued services, but are the terms at which a finished
product or certain rights therein may be sold. And no wages
or working conditions of any group of employees are directly
dependent on these terms. We think the exception therefore
268
inapplicable.
This line of cases suggests the following rules of thumb for
combinations involving persons nominally characterized as
independent contractors: some independent contractors are shielded
by the labor exemption if they are substitutes for employees.
Independent contractors who are truly independent, however, such as
indie musicians, independent theatre companies or producers, or
indie movie-makers, enjoy no labor exemption.

267. 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945).
268. Id. at 652.
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10. Statutory anti-competitive approaches—FLSA

Even when collective bargaining does not operate, the federal
269
puts a floor under labor-market
Fair Labor Standards Act
competition, by prohibiting employers from paying less than the
270
minimum wage and by limiting the number of hours per week that
employees may work without being paid a premium—usually time
271
and a half their regular wage for hours worked in excess of forty.
These limits on competition, however, are not comprehensive in
scope. The Act excludes independent contractors; professionals and
managers, in particular actors and writers; and students.
The six-factor Silk test 272 is used to determine whether someone is
273
a covered employee under the FLSA. Actors, even participants in
reality television shows, usually qualify as employees rather than
274
independent contractors.
11. FLSA exemption for actors, writers, and directors

The FLSA exempts certain professional employees from the
275
State labor
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the act.
276
standards regulation typically provides a similar exemption.

269. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
270. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006).
271. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006).
272. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 712-18 (1947) (holding that workers were
employees in payroll tax case); see Schultz v. Capital Intern. Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 305
(4th Cir. 2006) (referring to "Silk factors").
273. Adam P. Greenberg, Reality’s Kids: Are Children Who Participate on Reality
Television Shows Covered Under the Fair Labor Standards Act? 82 S. CAL L. REV. 595,
612-17 (2009) [hereinafter “Greenberg”] (arguing that federal FLSA covers child actors;
explaining each of the six factors and citing cases).
274. See Greenberg, supra note 273, at 632-638 (working through each of the six
factors). Mr. Greenberg’s analysis of child actors in reality shows leads, a fortiori, to the
conclusion that adult actors on scripted shows are employees, because they are subject to
even great control by producers and directors. He admits however that involvement for
less than a full season might cause the permanence-of-employment factor to militate
against employee status. Greenberg, supra note 273, at 644 (participating in only one
episode is not permanent enough).
275. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006); 29 CFR § 541.302(c) (2012) (noting that actors
generally meet the requirements of professional exemptions from FLSA).
276. See CALIFORNIA INDUSTRIAL WELFARE COMMISSION ORDER NO.
10-2001 REGULATING WAGES, HOURS AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE
AMUSEMENT
AND
RECREATION
INDUSTRY,
http://www.dir.ca.gov/IWC/IWCArticle10.pdf (requiring $8 per hour and time and a half
for overtime) (2001). See Id. at sec. 2(A)(defining “amusement and recreation industry”
to include theatres); Id. at sec. 1(A)(3)(b)(ii) (exempting original and creative work in a
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Arguments persist, however, over when performers and writers
perform sufficiently creative work to qualify for the artist
277
exemption.
12. Coverage of volunteers and students

The effect of the FLSA in the entertainment industries is further
limited because it does not cover most volunteers, thus exempting
many participants in small-scale theatre and moviemaking. It also
278
In
does not cover students, thus exempting college athletes.
279
Purdham v. Fairfax County School Board, the court of appeals
affirmed a holding by the district court that a high-school golf coach
was a “volunteer,” and thus was not entitled to overtime
compensation under the FLSA. Like other coaches in the school
system, the plaintiff held a regular, salaried job with the school system
and coached on the side. He received reimbursement of expenses
280
and a $2,100 “stipend” for his coaching activities. As the dispute
was developing, the Department of Labor issued a “guidance opinion
letter,” concluding that certain school coaches were volunteers
281
instead of employees.
Under the FLSA, “ ‘employ’ [means] to suffer or permit to
282
To be sure, this definition was “not intended to
work.”
stamp all persons as employees who, without any express or
implied compensation agreement, might work for their own

recognized field of artistic endeavor, to be construed pursuant to 29 C.F.R. Sections
541.207, 541.301(a)-(d), 541.302, 541.306, 541.307, 541.308, and 541.310).
277. See Alexis Miller, Reality Check for Production Companies: Why Writers on
Reality Television Are Entitled to Overtime Pay, 27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 185 (2007)
(arguing that reality television writers are not sufficiently creative to quality for the FLSA
artist exemption; also reviewing possibility of representation by Writers Guild);
Greenberg, supra note 273, at 612-17. Mr. Greenberg argues that child performers on
reality television shows should not qualify as exempt actors for policy reasons that should,
in his view, narrow the actor exemption for reality show child participants. Id. at 642
(noting that producers often deny “actor” status to avoid union representation for
AFTRA and SAG).
278. But see Leroy D. Clark, New Directions for the Civil Rights Movement: College
Athletics as a Civil Rights Issue, 36 HOW. L.J. 259, 279-80 (1993) (proposing litigation
claiming that college athletes are employees within the meaning of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and state workers compensation statutes).
279. 637 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2011).
280. Id. at 426.
281. Id. at (describing, but not citing, DOL letter).
282. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2006).
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advantage on the premises of another,” nor should it be
interpreted so as to ‘sweep under the Act each person who,
without promise or expectation of compensation, but solely
for his personal purpose or pleasure, work[s] in activities
carried on by other persons either for their pleasure or profit.
….
The FLSA does not itself define volunteer, but pursuant to a
Department of Labor regulation promulgated under the
FLSA, a volunteer is an individual who performs hours of
service for a public agency for civic, charitable, or
humanitarian reasons, without promise, expectation or receipt
of compensation for services rendered. At the same time,
‘[v]olunteers may be paid expenses, reasonable benefits, a
nominal fee, or any combination thereof, for their service
283
without losing their status as volunteers.’
The usual definition of “employee” is not helpful in the volunteer
context, says the Fourth Circuit:
Other courts have looked to the economic realities test in the
FLSA context in determining whether an individual is an
employee or a volunteer. However, they have concluded that
the test is best suited to determine whether, as a matter of
economic reality, an individual is in business for himself or
herself as an independent contractor, or is an employee of
another. As a result, the economic realities test is of limited
utility in determining whether an individual is an ‘employee,’
284
as opposed to a ‘volunteer.’
The likelihood that college athletes are protected by the FLSA is
low because of the pervasive view that they qualify as “students.”
While some courts have used the economic reality test from
independent-contractor controversies to assess student status, most
examine whether the individual performing the work or the
institution for which he works receives the primary benefit of the

283. Id. at 427-28 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
284. Id. at 433-34 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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work. 285 If the individual receives the benefit, student status is more
likely; if the institution receives the benefit, employee status is more
likely.
The challenges for anyone wishing to assert FLSA protection for
college athletes are manifold. First, the athletes are formally
classified as students; indeed NCAA eligibility rules require student
286
In Agnew v.
status as a pre-requisite for playing college sports.
287
NCAA, the court emphasized the centrality of NCAA eligibility
rules in defining the nature of college sports.
On the other hand:
No knowledgeable observer could earnestly assert that bigtime college football programs competing for highly soughtafter high school football players do not anticipate economic
gain from a successful recruiting program. Despite the
nonprofit status of NCAA member schools, the transactions
those schools make with premier athletes—full scholarships in
exchange for athletic services—are not noncommercial, since
schools can make millions of dollars as a result of these
transactions. FN5 Indeed, this is likely one reason that some
schools are willing to pay their football coaches up to $5
million a year rather than invest that money into educational
resources. . . . Thus, the transactions between NCAA schools
and student-athletes are, to some degree, commercial in
nature, and therefore take place in a relevant market with
288
respect to the Sherman Act.
In evaluating NCAA limitations on scholarships, however, it is
recognized that scholarships are a form of payment for services, in
effect recognizing that playing sports is performing “work” for the
sponsoring college:

285. See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 532 (6th Cir.
2011) (affirming denial of injunction for violation of FLSA child-labor provisions by
school that emphasized practical work for training purposes; reviewing cases and applying
primary benefit test).
286. NCAA
Division
I
Manual
§
12.01.1,
(2012),
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D1_2012_01.pdf (“Only an amateur
student-athlete is eligible for intercollegiate athletics participation in a particular sport”).
287. 683 F.3d 328, 343 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of Sherman Act suit
challenging limitation on athletic scholarships).
288. Id.
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It is true that the prohibition against multi-year scholarships
is, in a sense, a rule concerning the amount of payment a
player receives for his labor, and thus may seem to implicate
the split between amateur and pay-for-play sports. After all,
student-athletes are paid, but their payment is limited to
reimbursement for costs attendant to receiving an education.
For the purposes of college sports, and in the name of
amateurism, we consider players who receive nothing more
than educational costs in return for their services to be
289
‘unpaid athletes.’
It is clear from this and other language quoted from the opinion
in
§ III(B) that the Seventh Circuit thought that a labor market
subject to the Sherman Act could be alleged, but it found that the
290
plaintiff’s complaint did not allege it. If a labor market exists, that
presupposes that the services performed are “work,” thus opening the
door to FLSA claims.

V. Tolerance of certain anti-competitive arrangements
Despite their identification with the promotion of competition,
the antitrust laws tolerate certain anti-competitive arrangements
likely to enhance efficiency and therefore consumer welfare.
Prominent among these are restrictions on competition in labor
markets. Others include anti-competitive regimes that also have procompetitive effects outweighing the diminution in competition.
Some of these anti-competitive arrangements may be within the
labor exemptions, when the employer-employee relationship is the
matrix of the controversy. Others are outside them, but are
nevertheless permissible because their pro-competitive effects
outweigh their harm to competition. This part of the article analyzes
typical anti-competitive arrangements in the entertainment industries,
asking whether they are within the labor exemptions and, regardless
of whether they are, the strength of their pro-competitive
justifications within the rule of reason.
Because the distinction between labor markets and product
291
markets is almost as indistinct as the boundaries of the labor

289. Agnew, 2011 WL 3878200 at *12.
290. Id. at *15 hn 19, 20.
291. See § III.A.3. (explaining variability of the thickness of intermediation between
product and labor markets).
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exemptions, this part makes no attempt to classify restrictions as
product-market restrictions or labor market restrictions.
A. Supreme Court touchstones for anti-competitive labor market
arrangements

The law privileges anti-competitive labor market arrangements
under the labor exemptions to the antitrust laws and under labor
standards legislation.
Synthesizing from the most prominent Supreme Court cases
considering the labor exemptions, one can conclude:
1. An agreement by employers to do business only with union
292
subcontractors is outside the exemption (Allen Bradley).
2. An agreement to put smaller employers out of business is
293
outside the exemption (Pennington).
3. An agreement by a non-union firm to subcontract work only to
294
union firms is outside the exemption (Connell).
4. Independent contractors may be covered by the exemption if
295
they compete with employees (H. A. Artists).
5. An agreement to limit hours of operation is within the
296
exemption (Jewell Tea Co.).
6. An agreement by employer-association members to provide
strike benefits to each other may be inside or outside the
297
exemption (Safeway, Inc.).
7. Unilateral imposition, after impasse, of a fixed salary is within
298
the exemption (Brown).
B. Concerted refusals to deal

Refusals to deal with workers in a particular class or concerted
refusals to deal with firms in a particular class are mainstream
limitations on competition. Indeed, every contract represents an
indirect refusal to deal. When a supply contract, say with an ISP for
an Internet connection, is exclusive, it expressly constitutes a refusal

292. Allen Bradley Co., 325 U.S. at 797.
293. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 657.
294. Connell, 421 U.S. at 616.
295. H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 704.
296. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. at 676.
297. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d at 1118.
298. Brown, 518 U.S. at 231.
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to deal with other ISPs for the term of the contract. Even when it is
not exclusive—as most are not—it lessens the demand for Internet
connections through other sellers because most Internet users need
only one connection at a particular facility. Such contracts enhance
the functioning of competitive markets because they provide
certainty of supply and price and strengthen the position of both
299
parties to the contract.
Concerted refusals to deal are more suspect than unilateral ones,
because they have stronger anti-competitive effect: they foreclose
more of the market for those who are locked out of the deal.
Concerted refusals are suspect under the antitrust laws because they
limit competition by excluding persons or entities from the
agreement. At the highest level of abstraction, concerted refusals to
deal involve networks that controls access to a resource—jobs or
product market channels. The network denies access to anyone who
is not a member of the network. This could involve a horizontal labor
network such as a union membership agreement that prohibits
members from working for a non-union employer, or it could be a
horizontal product network, such as a collective bargaining
agreement that prohibits an employer from using non-union labor.
But even concerted refusals to deal can have sufficient pro300
competitive effects to withstand antitrust attack.
Concerted refusals to deal thrive in labor and product markets in
the entertainment industries—as they indeed do in every industry.
Virtually every collective bargaining arrangement in the
entertainment industries provides an absolute or limited preference
301
302
for certain employees. The NFL collective bargaining agreement

299. E.g., “One problem presented by the language of § 1 of the Sherman Act is that
it cannot mean what it says. The statute says that ‘every’ contract that restrains trade is
unlawful. But, as Mr. Justice Brandeis perceptively noted, restraint is the very essence of
every contract; read literally, § 1 would outlaw the entire body of private contract law. Yet
it is that body of law that establishes the enforceability of commercial agreements and
enables competitive markets-indeed, a competitive economy-to function effectively.” City
of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 385 n.1 (1991) (rejecting
antitrust challenge to municipality’s restrictions on outdoor advertising).
300. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(holding that pro-competitive effects of horizontal agreements among patent holders to
set standards for writable CDs was valid under rule of reason).
301. Compare Agreement and Rules Governing Employment: Chicago Theaters,
EQUITY
ASSOCIATION
(2011),
ACTORS
http://www.actorsequity.org/docs/rulebooks/CAT_Rulebook_09-11.pdf., Rule 11(A) with
Agreement and Rules Governing Employment: Chicago Theaters, ACTORS EQUITY
ASSOCIATION (2011), http://www.actorsequity.org/docs/rulebooks/CAT_Rulebook_09-
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requires players either to become members of the union or to pay the
303
union a “service fee,” and prohibits teams from entering into
contracts with players except on form contracts provided in the
304
Television labor agreements limit
collective agreement.
305
employment to union members. Actors Equity, the union for stage
306
actors, prohibits working except under an Equity contract, and
provides for expulsion of members who work without a contract or
307
Equity controls the hiring process for Equity
Equity approval.
308
productions through its regulated audition process.
All of these are concerted refusals to deal with those not given a
preference.

11.pdf., Rule 44 (prohibiting employment of “non-professionals” until specified number of
Equity actors have been employed) with Agreement and Rules Governing Employment:
Chicago
Theaters,
ACTORS
EQUITY
ASSOCIATION
(2011),
http://www.actorsequity.org/docs/rulebooks/CAT_Rulebook_09-11.pdf.,
Rule
40
(explicitly permitting employment of “non-professionals”).
302. NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 39.
303. Id. at Art. 47, sec. 1.
304. Id. at Art. 4.
305. AFTRA
2010-2011
Interactive
Media
Agreement
§
13,
www.sagaftra.org/production-center/documents (prohibiting employer signatory from
employing performers who are not members of AFTRA or who make application for
membership within 30 days).
306. “[I]f you are an Equity member, you may not accept any work in Equity
jurisdiction without the appropriate contract. Even if the project is not listed here; you are
still obligated to call Equity if you are offered any stage work without a union contract.”
EQUITY
ASS’N,
Equity
4A’s
“Do
Not
Work”
Notice,
ACTOR’S
http://www.actorsequity.org/NewsMedia/TakeAction/Feb14.4As.asp (Apr. 2, 2012) (listing
theatres and production company for which Equity members may not work).
307. Actors’ Equity Ass’n Bylaws art. X, sec. 1.1(d).
“A member may be expelled, suspended, fined or otherwise disciplined for any of the
following offenses:
***
(d) engaging in any business, enterprise or activity which may directly or indirectly conflict
with the purposes or objects of the Association or any of its members, including by way of
example, work as a per former or stage manager in any form of theatre under the
jurisdiction of the Association without benefit of an Equity employment contract or code,
unless prior written consent by the Association has been granted.”
Actors Equity Ass’n Bylaws, ACTOR’S EQUITY ASS’N, art. X, sec. 1 & 1(d),
http://www.actorsequity.org/docs/about/AEA_ConstitutionBylaws.pdf.
308. See Mark D. Meredith, From Dancing Halls to Hiring Halls: Actors’ Equity and
the Closed Shop Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 178 (1996) (explaining and justifying
Equity’s role as a hiring hall, and reviewing its evolution from a pre-entry closed shop to
an operation allowing non-union actors to audition). Id. at 182 (advocating extension1 of
the immunity for closed shop hiring halls in the construction industry under 29 U.S.C. sec.
158(f) to Actors Equity).
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Wood v. NBA 309 involved an antitrust action challenging, among
other things, the college draft provisions of the national basketball
collective bargaining agreement as an illegal horizontal agreement to
eliminate competition for players’ services. The court held that the
horizontal agreement was so clearly shielded by the non-statutory
exemption that it need not decide whether the draft was a per se
310
violation or subject to rule of reason analysis.
The court likened the draft to a hiring hall arrangement:
[C]ollective agreements in a number of industries provide for
the exclusive referral of workers by a hiring hall to particular
employers at a specified wage. The choice of employer is
governed by the rules of the hiring hall, not the preference of
the individual worker. There is nothing that prevents such
agreements from providing that the employee either work for
the designated employer at the stipulated wage or not be
referred at that time. Otherwise, a union might find it difficult
to provide the requisite number of workers to employers.
Such an arrangement is functionally indistinguishable from
311
the college draft.
In Genser v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,312
the district court held that a hiring hall arrangement was shielded
from antitrust liability by the non-statutory labor exemption:
The Seniority System is basically a ‘hiring hall.’ When an
electrical contractor who is a party to the Principal
Agreement wishes to hire an additional electrician, he applies
to the System and the electrician with the greatest seniority is
referred to him. Such a System fills the legitimate labor
objective of providing job security in a labor market that is
313
both highly mobile and subject to underemployment.

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
Id. at 959.
Id. at 960 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
522 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
Id. at 1160.
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In Associated General Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co., 314 the
district court held that hiring hall arrangements are not prohibited
closed-shop arrangements under section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley
315
Act:
[A]greements that merely require an affiliation with a labor
union, such as a non-discriminatory, exclusive hiring-hall
arrangement, do not come within § 14(b)’s exception to Board
jurisdiction, for such an agreement does not require
316
Membership in a union.
Other concerted refusals to deal do not involve hiring halls, but
still protect the collective bargaining process. In H. A. Artists &
317
Associates, Inc. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, the Supreme Court
considered whether Equity violated the antitrust laws by prohibiting
its members from doing business with agents who did not pay Equity
a fee and agree to Equity’s rules limiting agent compensation.
The essential features of the regulatory scheme are identical:
members are permitted to deal only with agents who have
agreed (1) to honor their fiduciary obligations by avoiding
conflicts of interest, (2) not to charge excessive commissions,
and (3) not to book members for jobs paying less than the
union minimum. And as in Carroll, Equity’s regulation of
agents developed in response to abuses by employment agents
who occupy a critical role in the relevant labor market. The
agent stands directly between union members and jobs, and is
in a powerful position to evade the union’s negotiated wage
318
structure.
The Court found that the practical realities of the theatre industry
made it impossible for Equity to defend the integrity of the minimum
wage scale it negotiated with theatre producers without regulating
319
agency fees. It concluded, therefore, that the agents were a “labor

314. 457 F. Supp. 1207 (D. N.D. 1978) aff’d, 611 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding lack
of standing in antitrust action).
315. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b).
316. Associated Gen. Contractors, 457 F. Supp. at 1217.
317. 451 U.S. 704 (1981).
318. Id. at 719-720.
319. Id. at 720.
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group” and that the agreement between Equity and the agents fell
320
Equity’s franchise system for
within the statutory exemption.
agents essentially functioned as a substitute for Equity maintaining a
321
hiring hall.
Labor law circumscribes hiring hall arrangements, however. In
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
322
Carpenters, the Supreme Court evaluated a case about carpenters
picketing Sears after the company refused to agree to limit its
employment of carpenters to those that had been dispatched from the
323
union hiring hall.
If an object of the picketing was to force Sears into assigning
the carpentry work away from its employees to Union
members dispatched from the hiring hall, the picketing may
have been prohibited by § 8(b)(4)(D). Alternatively, if an
object of the picketing was to coerce Sears into signing a prehire or members-only type agreement with the Union, the
picketing was at least arguably subject to the prohibition on
324
recognitional picketing contained in § 8(b)(7)(C).
Outside the collective bargaining context, concerted refusals to
deal are not likely to be shielded by the labor exemptions, but they
nevertheless may sufficiently promote competition or other aspects of
325
social welfare that they do not result in antitrust liability.
C. Salary caps and other limitations on compensation of employees

Employers have an inherent interest in limiting their costs. Labor
costs are an important component of total costs in any entertainment

320. Id. at 721.
321. Id.
322. 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (holding that a state-law action for trespass was not
preempted by National Labor Relations Act).
323. Id. at 182.
324. Id. at 185-86 (internal footnotes omitted).
325. See Broadcast Music, Inc.. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979),
(approving horizontal arrangement for collective licensing of copyrights); Ticketmaster
Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 127 Fed. Appx. 346 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of
preliminary injunction for concerted refusal to deal; evidence showed competitive bidding
and exclusive contracts with duration no longer than six years); Flagship Theatres of Palm
Desert, LLC v. Century Theatres, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 519, 532 (2011) (reversing district
court and allowing discovery in state antitrust action by single movie theatre alleging that
exclusive film exhibition contracts violated rule of reason).
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industry. The possibility of the richest employers bidding up the
prices for stars is a phenomenon not only of professional sports, but
also of the movie and theatre industries. Concerted restrictions on
wage levels reduce competition in the labor market and are thus
subject to antitrust scrutiny unless they are shielded by the labor
exemption, or unless they escape per se illegality and pass muster
under rule of reason analysis. One possible justification for salary
caps is that they increase the possibility for weaker employers to
attract stars—or at least to conserve their resources in order to
326
remain competitive with stronger employers.
D. Employee mobility

In a competitive labor market, employees are free to change jobs
to seek better terms of employment, and employers are free to try to
hire employees from competitors. Firms have an interest in
restricting this mobility because when the demand for labor exceeds
the supply, competition will lead to employers bidding up wage rates,
resulting in higher labor costs. If an employer can contractually bind
existing employees to continue their services rather than seeking
other jobs, the employer limits wage inflation.
Moreover, competitive labor markets present the risks that an
employee with inside knowledge of an employer’s practices, including
but not limited to trade secrets, may take that knowledge to a
competitor. Covenants not to compete are common mechanisms to
327
reduce this risk.
The reserve clause and the free-agent system in professional
football represent important limitations on athletes’ power to change
teams, justified by the need to promote competitive balance. If
athletes were free to move around as they wished, they could all flock
to richer teams, leaving weaker teams unable to compete successfully.
Restrictions on “contract jumping”—the privilege of an employee
to move from one employer to another—is a source of controversy

326. See NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding salary cap,
among other restrictions valid under rule-of-reason analysis because it promoted
maintenance of competitive balance).
327. See Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that
covenants not to compete that barred employees of subsidiary from being employed by
seller of subsidiary satisfied antitrust rule of reason; limitation was necessary to assure
workforce continuity incident to corporate sale, and eight-month restrict was not too
broad).
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for most entertainment industries. Employers want to restrict
328
movement; employees want to facilitate it.
329
In Mackey v. NFL, the court of appeals held that the Rozelle
330
Rule violated the Sherman Act. It held that the non-statutory labor
exemption did not apply because the Rozelle Rule did not satisfy
three criteria for pre-eminence of labor policy over antitrust law:
1. The restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the
331
collective bargaining agreement;
2. The agreement must concern a mandatory subject of
bargaining; and
3. The agreement must be the product of bona-fide arm’s-length
332
bargaining.
While the Rozelle Rule affected only the parties to the
agreements and involved a mandatory subject of bargaining, it did not
involve bona fide arm’s-length bargaining, because it had remained
essentially unchanged since it was unilaterally imposed by the teams
333
in 1963.
Because the labor exemption was unavailable, the court moved to
apply antitrust principles.
Finding that per se illegality was
334
inappropriate, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court’s
analysis of the anti-competitive effect of the Rule:
[T]he Rozelle Rule significantly deters clubs from negotiating
with and signing free agents; that it acts as a substantial
deterrent to players playing out their options and becoming
free agents; that it significantly decreases players’ bargaining

328. BERRY, supra note 64, at n. 7.
329. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
330. “The Rozelle Rule essentially provides that when a player’s contractual
obligation to a team expires and he signs with a different club, the signing club must
provide compensation to the player’s former team. If the two clubs are unable to conclude
mutually satisfactory arrangements, the Commissioner may award compensation in the
form of one or more players and/or draft choices as he deems fair and equitable.” Id. at
609 n.1.
331. Id. at 614-15 (citing Connell Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616, 62122 (1975);; Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965); Mine workers v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 615-16.
334. Id. at 620.
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power in contract negotiations; that players are thus denied
the right to sell their services in a free and open market; that
as a result, the salaries paid by each club are lower than if
competitive bidding were allowed to prevail; and that absent
the Rozelle Rule, there would be increased movement in
335
interstate commerce of players from one club to another.
As to the alleged pro-competitive effects of the Rule, the court
rejected the NFL’s assertion of the Rule’s necessity for maintenance
of competitive balance within the league:
We need not decide whether a system of inter-team
compensation for free agents moving to other teams is
essential to the maintenance of competitive balance in the
NFL. Even if it is, we agree with the district court’s
conclusion that the Rozelle Rule is significantly more
restrictive than necessary to serve any legitimate purposes it
might have in this regard. First, little concern was manifested
at trial over the free movement of average or below average
players. Only the movement of the better players was urged
as being detrimental to football. Yet the Rozelle Rule applies
to every NFL player regardless of his status or ability.
Second, the Rozelle Rule is unlimited in duration. It operates
as a perpetual restriction on a player’s ability to sell his
services in an open market throughout his career. Third, the
enforcement of the Rozelle Rule is unaccompanied by
procedural safeguards. A player has no input into the process
by which fair compensation is determined. Moreover, the
player may be unaware of the precise compensation
demanded by his former team, and that other teams might be
336
interested in him but for the degree of compensation sought.
Employees retain more mobility in the theatre industry, where
the need to promote competitive balance is attenuated. For example,
the master agreement between Actors Equity and Chicago Area
Theatres explicitly allows actors to accept “more remunerative

335. Id.
336. Id. at 622.
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employment” from other productions, even when they are under
337
contract to another production.
E. Assuring a stream of new talent

In purely competitive labor markets, the transaction costs of
matching employers with employees (or independent contractors) can
be high, especially when the markets are regional or national in scope
rather than local. Both buyers and sellers of labor have an interest in
such markets of supporting intermediaries that reduce the costs.
Depending on how the intermediation is structured, however, it may
have anti-competitive effects in product markets that go beyond what
338
is necessary to improve labor market efficiency.
The draft system in professional football is intended, on the one
hand, to assure competitive balance by steering new talent to
different teams equitably. But it also serves the interests of new
talent by establishing a transparent “hiring hall” in which all players
339
entering the professional sports arena are assured of visibility.
In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 340 the court of appeals held that the
341
draft violated the Sherman Act under rule of reason analysis. The

337. Agreement and Rules Governing Employment: Chicago Theaters, supra note
300.
338. An antitrust challenge by medical students to the mandatory residency match
program was interrupted by a federal statute giving the match program an exemption to
the antitrust laws. See Jung v. Assoc. of Am. Med. Colleges, 339 F. Supp .2d 26, 31
(D.D.C. 2004) (describing claim and legislation).
339. See generally NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 39 at Art. 6
(providing for and regulating team choices in “College Draft”).
340. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
341. The NFL draft, which has been in effect since 1935, is a procedure under which
negotiating rights to graduating college football players are allocated each year among the
NFL clubs in inverse order of the clubs’ standing. Under the draft procedures generally
followed, the team with the poorest playing-field record during the preceding season has
the first opportunity, as among the NFL teams, to select a college player of its choice; the
team with the next poorest record has the next choice, and so on until the team with the
best record (the winner of the previous year’s “Super Bowl”) has picked last. At this
point, the first “round” of the draft is completed. In 1968 there were 16 succeeding rounds
in the yearly draft, the same order of selection being followed in each round. Teams had
one choice per round unless they had traded their choice in that round to another team (a
fairly common practice). When Smith was selected by the Redskins there were 26 teams
choosing in the draft.
The NFL draft, like similar procedures in other professional sports, is designed to
promote ‘competitive balance.’ By dispersing newly arriving player talent equally among
all NFL teams, with preferences to the weaker clubs, the draft aims to produce teams that
are as evenly-matched on the playing field as possible. Evenly-matched teams make for
closer games, tighter pennant races, and better player morale, thus maximizing fan
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NFL did not appeal that part of the district court’s ruling that the
342
labor exemption did not apply.
The court of appeals rejected the district court’s conclusion that
343
the draft constituted a group boycott, which is per se illegal, and
concluded that the draft differed from a classic group boycott:
[The teams are] not Competitors in any economic sense. The
clubs operate basically as a joint venture in producing an
entertainment product football games and telecasts. No NFL
club can produce this product without agreements and joint
action with every other team. To this end, the League not
only determines franchise locations, playing schedules, and
broadcast terms, but also ensures that the clubs receive equal
shares of telecast and ticket revenues. These economic joint
venturers ‘compete’ on the playing field, to be sure, but here
as well cooperation is essential if the entertainment product is
to attain a high quality: only if the teams are “competitively
balanced” will spectator interest be maintained at a high
pitch. No NFL team, in short, is interested in driving another
team out of business, whether in the counting-house or on the
football field, for if the League fails, no one team can
344
survive.
The per se prohibition of group boycotts is properly restricted to
concerted attempts by competitors to exclude horizontal competitors;
it does not apply to concerted refusals to deal aimed at some other
345
goal.
Under rule of reason analysis, the court accepted the district
346
court’s findings of severe anti-competitive effect:
The draft inescapably forces each seller of football services to
deal with one, and only one buyer, robbing the seller, as in
interest, broadcast revenues, and overall health of the sport.” Id. at 1175-76 (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
342. Id. at 1177 n.11. It found the labor exemption inapplicable because the draft was
not the product of collective bargaining and did not constitute a mandatory subject of
bargaining. Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 742-43 (aff’d in part, rev’d in part
Smith, 593 F.2d at 1173).
343. Id. at 1178, 1181(rejecting per se analysis).
344. 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
345. Id. at 1180
346. Id. at 1183-84.
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any monopsonistic market, of any real bargaining power. The
draft leaves no room whatever for competition among the
teams for the services of college players, and utterly strips
them of any measure of control over the marketing of their
talents. The predictable effect of the draft . . . was to lower
the salary levels of the best college players. There can be no
doubt that the effect of the draft as it existed in 1968 was to
suppress or even destroy competition in the market for
347
players’ services.
The court then proceeded to consider—and to reject—the procompetitive justification for the draft:
The draft is precompetitive, if at all, in a very different sense
from that in which it is anticompetitive. The draft is
anticompetitive in its effect on the market for players’
services, because it virtually eliminates economic competition
among buyers for the services of sellers. The draft is allegedly
procompetitive in its effect on the playing field; but the NFL
teams are not economic competitors on the playing field, and
the draft, while it may heighten athletic competition and thus
improve the entertainment product offered to the public, does
not increase competition in the economic sense of
encouraging others to enter the market and to offer the
product at lower cost. . . . In strict economic terms, the draft’s
348
demonstrated procompetitive effects are nil.
The court suggested alternatives that would have less anticompetitive effect:
Without intimating any view as to the legality of the following
procedures, we note that there exist significantly less
anticompetitive alternatives to the draft system which has
been challenged here. The trial judge found that the evidence
supported the viability of a player selection system that would
permit more than one team to draft each player, while
restricting the number of players any one team might sign. A
less anticompetitive draft might permit a college player to

347. Id. at 1185-86 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
348. Id. at 1186-87 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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negotiate with the team of his choice if the team that drafted
him failed to make him an acceptable offer. The NFL could
also conduct a second draft each year for players who were
unable to reach agreement with the team that selected them
the first time. Most obviously, perhaps, the District Court
found that the evidence supported the feasibility of a draft
that would run for fewer rounds, applying only to the most
talented players and enabling their ‘average’ brethren to
negotiate in a ‘free market’ The least restrictive alternative of
all, of course, would be for the NFL to eliminate the draft
entirely and employ revenue-sharing to equalize the teams’
financial resources a method of preserving ‘competitive
balance’ nicely in harmony with the league’s self-proclaimed
349
‘joint-venture’ status.
The court then remanded for consideration of damages. 350
In the theatre and movie industries, the initial hiring process is
less comprehensive. Anyone may try out at an open audition, but
only Equity Members and Equity Candidates may participate in
Equity-run auditions. The Equity agreement requires a certain
number of days of open auditions for Equity members and
351
candidates, without restricting auditions for non-equity members.
The movie industry has more explicit provisions to assure entrylevel opportunity. The Screen Actor’s Guild (“SAG”) agreement has
specific non-discrimination provisions to enhance casting
opportunities for disadvantaged groups, including the disabled and
352
older actors. It also prohibits excluding actors without agents from
353
auditions.
F. Contracting out

In a perfectly competitive market, firms can decide whether to
“make or buy.” 354 Hiring contractors to do the work that employees
otherwise can do, however, obviously has an adverse effect on
present or potential employees. Workers have an interest in
349. Id. at 1187-88 (internal footnotes omitted).
350. Id. at 1191.
351. CAT Agreement, supra note 300, at Rule 5(B)(2).
352. Screen Actors Guild, 2005 Theatrical Agreement Art. 26(a)(4) and (5),
http://www.sag.org/files/sag/2005TheatricalAgreement.pdf.
353. Id. at Art. 26(a)6(b).
354. See discussion of Coase Theorem in § VI.B.
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restricting that competition between independent contractors and
employees.
355
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, the Supreme
Court agreed with the NLRB that contracting out work previously
performed by members of the bargaining unit constituted a
356
In First National Maintenance
mandatory subject of bargaining.
357
Corp. v. NLRB, however, the Supreme Court held that an employer
has no duty under the NLRA to bargain with a union over a decision
to terminate a relationship with an important customer and to close a
part of its business. It distinguished pure business decisions from
decisions about employment conditions:
The present case concerns a . . . type of management
decision . . . , that had a direct impact on employment, since
jobs were inexorably eliminated by the termination, but [also]
had as its focus only the economic profitability of the contract
with Greenpark, a concern under these facts wholly apart
358
from the employment relationship.
The Court concluded that the harm to the employer’s need to
make a management decision to shut down part of its business
outweighed the incremental benefit of requiring bargaining with the
359
union. It left undisturbed, however, the basic holding of Fibreboard
and declined to express a view on whether other types of
management decisions such as subcontracting or automation might be
360
subject to the duty to bargaining.
G. Regulating channels for reaching audiences

In a perfectly competitive product market, competition exists at
every stage of the supply chain: each potential purchaser of goods or
servers can compete to get the best deal, and every potential seller of
goods and services can compete for the business of every purchaser.
Exclusive distribution and supply arrangements are common,

355. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
356. Id. at 209.
357. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
358. Id. at 676-77 [internal quotations and citations omitted].
359. Id. at 686.
360. Id. at 686 n.22 (citing Dan Dee West Virginia Corp., 180 N.L.R.B. 534 (1970)
(decision to change method of distribution, under which employee-drivers became
independent contractors).
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however, in most industries. The entertainment industries are no
exception.
In the movie industry, completing a movie does not ensure that
anyone will ever see it. Distribution and exhibition are necessary to
connect movies with audiences. Major studios perform not only
production, but also distribution functions.
The Paramount
361
decision prohibits them from also being in the exhibition business.
Independent producers, however, often contract with others for
distribution. The terms of distribution deals affect the capacity of a
producer to pay actors and other employees, so the SAG agreement
contains detailed regulations for distribution enterprises and the
362
agreements with them.
In Flash Electronics, Inc. v. Universal Music & Video Distribution
363
Corp., independent distributors of home videos and DVDs of
movies and TV shows filed a section 1 Sherman Act challenge against
exclusive distribution contracts between the major movie studios and
the plaintiffs’ competing distribution firms. The district court began
its analysis by noting that vertical restraints, such as one between
movie studios and firms that distribute their product to retailers,
typically are evaluated under the rule of reason rather than treated as
364
The court noted the kinds of pro-competitive
per se violations.
effects that vertical deals can have:
[V]ertical restrictions on intrabrand competition often have
the procompetitive effect of increasing interbrand
competition in the relevant market. . . . Accordingly,
manufacturers should be given wide latitude in determining
the profile of [their] distributorships. Indeed . . . , absent a
showing of price-fixing or an anticompetitive effect on the
market as a whole, run-of-the-mill exclusive distributorship
365
agreements are presumptively legal.
This is a less important issue in professional sports, where the
teams and the leagues directly perform marketing and organize
games, or in the theatre industry, where a production rarely proceeds

361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
Screen Actors Guild, supra note 351 at Art. 6 (responsibility for payments).
312 F. Supp. 2d 379 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
Id. at 386.
Id. at 386-387 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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beyond the script stage unless theatre space for the performance has
already been arranged.
H. Sharing new product-market revenue streams

Technology driven revolutions produce new sources of revenue
for entertainment. Whether and how to share those new revenue
streams with employees is a frequent source of controversy. The 2011
366
Television Decision forced the NFL to share additional television
revenues from its deal to protect itself from the adverse effects of a
strike or lockout. The 2007 strike by the Writers’ Guild over shares
367
of DVD and Internet revenue for television shows and movies is
another example. In 2011 a class action lawsuit over collection and
distribution of statutory royalties for sales of blank DVDs and tapes
368
was settled. The 2010 American Needle Supreme Court decision,
discussed below, involving licensing fees for sales of sports
369
paraphernalia, is yet another example.
The Safeway case, analyzed in § IV(B)(2), observed that, under
370
revenue sharing
Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States,
arrangements usually are per se antitrust violations. Safeway
distinguished the strike-benefits provision in the case before it
however, because of its short-term nature and its limited coverage,
371
It
holding that it must be evaluated under the rule of reason.
should also have included its obvious relationship to a labor dispute
as part of the rule of reason analysis, but it did not.
In American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 372 a case involving licensing of
intellectual property in sports paraphernalia, the Supreme Court
rejected the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that the NFL functioned as
a “single entity” with respect to licensing intellectual property.

366. See § 2.2(D).
367. Times
Topics,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
10,
2008)
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/organizations/w/writers_guild_of_a
merica/index.html.
368. See Notice, SCREEN ACTORS GUILD, http://www.sag.org/notice.
369. See generally STAUDOHAR, supra note 2 at 58 (noting the increasing importance
to football of licensing fees).
370. 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (holding that profit pooling by competing newspapers
constituted a per se violation of section 1).
371. 651 F.3d at 1134-36.
372. American Needle, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010).
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Directly relevant to this case, the teams compete in the
market for intellectual property. To a firm making hats, the
Saints and the Colts are two potentially competing suppliers
of valuable trademarks. When each NFL team licenses its
intellectual property, it is not pursuing the common interests”
of the whole league but is instead pursuing interests of each
corporation itself; teams are acting as “separate economic
actors pursuing separate economic interests, and each team
therefore is a potential independent center of decision
making. Decisions by NFL teams to license their separately
owned trademarks collectively and to only one vendor are
decisions that deprive the marketplace of independent centers
of decision making, and therefore of actual or potential
373
competition.
The Supreme Court remanded for rule of reason analysis of NFL
374
exclusive licensing arrangements for team logos and paraphernalia.
The technological revolution impacts professional athletics by
opening up new streams of revenue from videogames and Internet
fantasy sports involvement. College football players have challenged,
under the Sherman Act, the practice of colleges under NCAA rules
requiring college athletes to give colleges the exclusive power to
375
license athlete images and personal identifying information.
I.

Limiting competition by independent contractors

A competitive market for independent contractors threatens
employees with established market positions in two ways. First, it
undercuts employee wage standards when an employer can get work
done more cheaply by hiring independent contractors instead of
hiring or retaining employees. Second, it undercuts product-market
positions when firms, rather than individuals, are active in the same
product market as employees.
Three kinds of competitive restrictions on independent contracts
arise to limit competition. Unions may bargain for limitations on
contracting out in collective bargaining agreements. Firms may seek

373. Id. at 2212-13.
374. Id. at 2217.
375. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 091967 CW, 2012 WL 1745593 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss
Sherman Act complaint).
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to exclude independent contractors from the product market by
making deals with customers or suppliers of essential factors of
production. Independent contractors may seek to band together to
limit competition among themselves.
The general view is that independent contractors may not benefit
from the labor exemption by banding together and calling themselves
376
a labor union. In Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh
377
Plate Glass Co., the Supreme Court reviewed the evolution of the
statutory definition of “employee,” noting that Congress had
amended the National Labor Relations Act explicitly to exclude
“independent contractors,” after the Supreme Court, in NLRB v.
378
Hearst Publications, agreed with the NLRB that newspaper street
379
vendors were statutory employees.
The prohibition is not absolute, however:
Even though a challenged combination includes independent
contractors or entrepreneurs, it may come within the statutory
exemption if the non-employee parties to the combination are
in job or wage competition with the employee parties, or in
some other economic interrelationship that substantially
380
affects the legitimate interests of the employees.
In Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild of America, Inc.,381
already analyzed in § IV(B)(9) HBO filed an antitrust action against
an association of freelance directors. The directors defended based
on the labor exemption. The district court decided that the statutory
exemption applied, because the directors qualified for employee
status, rather than independent contractor status, and because they
382
competed with salaried employees.

376. Los Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94,
102-03 (1962) (holding that independent grease peddlers not immune from antitrust
injunction requiring them to disband); Columbia River Packers, 315 U.S. at 147 (holding
that association of independent fisherman who wanted to fix prices were not covered by
labor exemption).
377. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
378. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
379. Allied Chemical, 404 U.S. at 167.
380. Home Box Office, 531 F. Supp. at 589.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 595 -97 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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In Julien v. Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers, Inc., 383
the district court determined that stage directors were entitled to
labor exemption because they were employees. The producer
exercised control over every aspect of work. One with experience in
theatre might dispute the general validity of this assertion. In many
productions, the director is the boss.
In Ring v. Spina, 384 the court determined that playwrights were
not entitled to the labor exemption:
Here not only are the disputing parties not in an employeremployee relationship, but, unlike the Allen Bradley case, the
controversy cannot concern itself with conditions of
employment, since none of the parties affected are in any true
sense employees. An author writing a book or play is usually
not then even in any contractual relation with his producer. If
and when he does contract, he does not continue in the
producer’s service to any appreciable or continuous extent
thereafter. Normally the author appears more nearly like the
fishermen entrepreneurs of the Hinton case or the doctors in
the American Medical Association case than workmen banded
together in a union. The minimum price and royalties
provided by the Basic Agreement, unlike minimum wages in a
collective bargaining agreement, are not remuneration for
continued services, but are the terms at which a finished
product or certain rights therein may be sold. And no wages
or working conditions of any group of employees are directly
dependent on these terms. We think the exception therefore
385
inapplicable.
This line of cases suggests the following rules of thumb for
agreements among persons nominally characterized as independent
contractors. Some independent contractors are shielded by the labor
exemption if they are substitutes for employees. Independent
contractors who are truly independent, however, such as indie
musicians, independent theatre companies or producers, or indie
movie-makers, enjoy no labor exemption.

383. No. 68 Civ. 5120, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15839 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 7, 1975).
384. 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945).
385. Id. at 652.
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Controlling other labor-market intermediaries
386

The Supreme Court’s decision in H.A. Artists
shielded
collectively bargained restrictions on booking agents in the theatre
industry, finding that the union had a legitimate interest in regulating
agents in order to protect the union’s wage bargain with theatres.
The NCAA has even more comprehensive regulations for sports
agents, outside the collective bargaining context. (College athletes
are not employees, and thus not entitled to engage in collective
387
bargaining under the NLRA).
Rule of reason analysis is likely to validate such restrictions. 388
Rules forbidding payments to athletes and requiring athletes to
attend class are necessary for the product (college athletic contests)
389
to exist at all. Regulation of agent payments to college athletes can
be justified as necessary to protect the more fundamental rules of
390
The Tenth Circuit, however,
forbidding payments to athletes.
found that NCAA limitations on coaches’ salaries did not survive
“quick-look” rule of reason analysis because its adverse effect on
competition in the labor market for coaches outweighed its pro391
competitive effect.

VI. The revolution and the rule of law
The football wars of 2011 played out old controversies over how
to restrict competition in labor and product markets that might
unravel structures needed to present a particular form of
entertainment—football games—to the public. The 2011 football
conflicts also illustrated jostling over how to split new forms of
revenue. The technological revolution is upending old structures for
presenting entertainment far more broadly than in the professional
football industry. It is changing how performers compete and how
they coordinate their activities.

386. 451 U.S. 704 (1981).
387. See Blake Nielsen, Misconduct in Intercollegiate Sports: Inappropriate Benefits
and
Communications
Between
Agents
and
Collegiate
Athletes
(2010),
http://www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/courses/seminar/nielsen%20final%20sport%20agent.pdf,
at 20-21 (discussing antitrust restrictions on NCAA).
388. See generally Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
389. Id. at 1018.
390. See United States v. Walters, 711 F. Supp. 1435, 1442 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding
that NCAA eligibility rules did not violate antitrust law in prosecution of sports agents for
post-dating contracts with college athletes to evade NCAA rules).
391. 134 F.3d at 1024.
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Even in professional football, where fundamental changes in the
way the industry is structured are unlikely, new revenue streams,
some attributable more to individual celebrity than to the Sunday
afternoon performances on the field, are shaping new arenas for
conflict.
In other entertainment industries, the changes in
fundamental structure are profound. How the law should respond to
these changes is far more than a matter of adjusting the boundary
between labor and antitrust law (the definition of the labor
exemption). It involves grappling with the question of when
competition improves overall welfare and when it diminishes it.
The labor exemptions to the antitrust laws reflect a national
policy that favors collective bargaining. That national policy, in turn,
is premised on the idea that employees lack bargaining power vis-à392
The concern about
vis employers unless they band together.
disparate bargaining power is appropriate more broadly in the
entertainment industries as the technological revolution fragments
production entities and blurs the distinction between labor markets
and product markets.
In many cases, the new, more atomized markets will function just
fine under competition.
In such cases, aggressive antitrust
enforcement is socially beneficial. In other cases, production of the
particular product requires restraints on competition, such as
subsidies flowing from the richer firms to the poorer ones—as in the
professional football market.
In large-scale sports, such
arrangements and subsidies are a mainstay. In other areas they are
completely absent.
Moreover, any assessment of the operation of revolutionary labor
markets in entertainment is incomplete without considering what has
become one of the most powerful tools to suppress competition:
overaggressive interpretation and enforcement of copyright law.
A. Implications for the future of the labor exemption

As the Introduction pointed out, Internet-related technologies are
likely to shift controversies between workers and those hiring them
from relatively certain territory involving long-standing definitions of
the labor exemptions into less certain territory where the boundaries
of the exemptions must be tested. Technology also is likely to push

392. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 552 (1979)
(observing that motivation for NLRA was to equalize bargaining power between
employers and employees).
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controversies beyond the boundaries of the labor exemptions into
antitrust territory where the antitrust rule of reason will require
balancing anti-competitive effects against pro-competitive effects
arising from the peculiar structural characteristics of the particular
industry sector.
Two paradigmatic extremes illustrate the continuum along which
the labor exemption operates. At one extreme is a market in which
individual performers—say performance artists—band together to set
theatre rental prices. At the other extreme is a market in which the
cast of a stage play bands together to insist on limits on rehearsal
schedules.
Changes in industry structure may give rise to controversies that
resemble union-management conflict, and which therefore invite
further litigation over the scope of the labor exemption. Indie
musicians could organize to put pressure on performance venues to
agree to minimum terms for public performances by indie musicians
and bands. It is unlikely that such concerted action would qualify for
either labor exemption. Indie musicians do not look like employees
under the well-established tests and they would be hard pressed to
argue that the purchase of their services by venues qualifies as a labor
market rather than a product market. Nevertheless, it is true that
venues wanting to provide their customers with live music can either
hire musicians as employees or retain the services of independent
musicians. In this sense the relevant market is a labor market.
Actors and production crafts could band together to put pressure
on theatres and movie production companies to guarantee a certain
number of slots for early-career-state personnel. The Equity
agreements already seek to open up opportunities for new talent in
specific categories, especially the disabled. If such efforts to
accommodate new talent are part of the collective bargaining process,
it almost certainly is exempt from antitrust scrutiny. Likewise, if the
new talent acts in concert with non-union sectors of the movie and
theatre industries, exemption from antitrust liability also is likely
depending on the craft. Actors and directors look like employees
under the traditional tests; writers, producers, lighting and sound
designers, and set designers look more like independent contractors.
Cinematographers fall somewhere in between, especially on indie
productions.
Itinerant theatre companies could band together to achieve more
favorable terms from performance spaces renting theatre space.
Exemption is unlikely because even the poorest theatre company is a
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business rather than an individual offering labor services. Any rule of
reason argument would have to establish the pro-competitive effect
of assuring the survival of independent theatre.
Indie movie producers could band together to put pressure on
distribution companies, including new Internet distribution firms, to
achieve access. Eligibility for a labor exemption is unlikely because
indie movie producers, like itinerant theatre companies, look like
firms rather than individuals. They could also band together to
license such movies to major content providers such as iTunes,
Amazon, YouTube, and Vimeo, and to social networks such as
MySpace. The problem here is that no labor market is involved.
Producers of indie movies are classic businessmen; as independent
contractors, they do not substitute for employees and compete with
them; they compete with and hope to substitute for larger movie
producers.
The pro-competitive argument would be stronger
however, if Amazon, iTunes, Hulu, and social networks begin to
strike more deals that provide exclusivity or especially favorable
terms to large studios.
Retired professional football players could break with the Players
Association and organize a separate concerted effort to bargain with
teams over retiree benefits. In Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers v.
393
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., the Supreme Court, disagreeing with the
Board, held that retirees are not statutory employees, and therefore
the benefits of already-retired persons are not mandatory subjects of
394
bargaining. This makes application of a labor exemption unlikely.
The retirees would also be hard-pressed to marshal a pro-competitive
argument under the rule of reason because they are no longer
competing in either product or labor markets.
The popularity of reality television shows has created stress on
traditional scope of union representation and the FLSA artist
395
exemption.
Regardless of the likelihood of these patterns developing, the
AFL/CIO is adapting to these changes in labor markets by launching
an initiative focused on jobs that do not fit the traditional model of

393. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
394. Id. at 158.
395. Christopher C. Cianci, Entertainment or Exploitation?: Reality Television and the
Inadequate Protection of Child Participants Under the Law, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J.
363, 363-64 nn. 4-5 (2009) (citing data suggesting that reality television has eroded union
penetration of television production industry).
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full-time, long-term, attachment of employees to one employer. 396
More, smaller units of production are becoming the norm.
Fragmentation of both product and labor markets, however, makes
collective bargaining more difficult. Fragmentation makes concerted
action more difficult because it increases the transaction costs of
organizing anti-competitive arrangements in the first place and of
397
Entertainmentpolicing them once they have been established.
industry unions know this. Thus the AFM makes no effort to
unionize indie rock bands, Actors Equity makes no effort to pressure
store-front theatres (except to restrict their use of Equity Actors),
and AFSCME and SAG mostly ignore the indie movie phenomenon.
One way to deal with the antitrust problem for the lower strata is
to think harder about impact on interstate commerce, particularly
398
after the Supreme Court’s decision on the Healthcare Reform Act,
which suggests that for legislation to be valid, federal legislation must
399
persuasively link small-scale conduct to interstate commerce. The
impact of a storefront theatre production on interstate commerce is
quite small. Exhibition of an indie movie on the Internet, however,
obviously involves interstate commerce, because the Internet is global
in its reach. Storefront theatre, garage bands, YouTube content
producers, and indie moviemaking have minimal direct impact on
interstate commerce, unlike concert tours by Linkin Park, a Chicago
Bears football game, the Broadway production of Death of a
Salesman, or the opening of the Avengers. But that will not solve the
problem of state competition law.
When no labor union is involved, the scope of the labor
exemption is extremely small: the core policy underpinning both
exemptions is the public-policy decision to promote collective
bargaining. When there is no collective bargaining to regulate the
labor market, and no prospect of its coming into existence, defenders
of an anti-competitive arrangement are hard-pressed to argue that a
labor exemption is available. If an employment relationship must be
the “matrix of the controversy” for an exemption to be available, and
less of the commerce occurs through employment relationships, the
operation of the exemptions diminishes.

396. Presentation by Richard Trumka, President of AFL/CIO at Chicago-Kent
College of Law, Oct. 6, 2011 (citing as examples taxi drivers and domestic workers).
397. Mancur Olsen, (The Logic of Collective Action) 44-50 (1965).
398. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
399. Id. at 2600.
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That means that more business arrangements that allegedly
interfere with competition are subject to antitrust analysis. The
central questions involve not a reshaping of the labor exemption in
the context of something that looks like traditional collective
bargaining, but a broader assessment of how the law and market
competition should interact in a world in which market structures are
determined largely by the Internet.
B. Beyond the labor exemption

The “Coase Theorem” postulates that a firm’s decision whether
to produce an input internally, with resources such as employees
bound to it over the course of time, or externally, with contracts
negotiated at arms’ length in the marketplace—often referred to as a
“make or buy” decision— is driven by the relative efficiency (cost) of
400
the alternative approaches.
Internet-linked technologies have increased the relative efficiency
of much work being performed outside traditional physical
401
The Coase Theorem accurately predicts that this
workplaces.
causes the boundaries of firms to contract and for a greater share of
labor to be performed under independent contracts rather than
through employment relationships.
This trend is particularly
402
and video entertainment
pronounced in the popular-music
403
industries. Fewer musicians reach their markets through long-term
deals with record labels and more musicians are proceeding
independently and finding their audiences through the Internet. The
studio system for producing Hollywood movies is long dead, and the
current trend is to look to independent moviemakers for movies to be
distributed through new channels.
The technological revolution has fragmented production systems
in certain parts of the entertainment industry—especially movies,
popular music, and some aspects of television—causing more

400. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Alan
Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Joint-Venture Analysis After American Needle, 7 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 543, 548 & n.29 (2011) (criticizing American Needle’s analysis
of single entity in antitrust law; referring to Coase Theorem).
401. See Mirian A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA. L. REV. 951 (2011)
(assessing implications for labor law of trend toward work being performed over the
Internet rather than from fixed workplaces).
402. Perritt, New architectures for music, supra note 11; Perritt New Business Models
for Music, supra note 11.
403. Perritt, Technologies of Storytelling, supra note 11.
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coordination of inputs to take place through contracts negotiated in
markets and fewer to take place within firms. Technology has driven
this fragmentation in large part because it has reduced the barriers to
404
Lower barriers to entry, in turn, have led to a more
entry.
competitive market with many more participants on the supply side.
Technology has also made it easier to make deals in the marketplace,
and this, in turn, is fragmenting units of production – shrinking firm
boundaries. That leads to increased transaction costs in the market,
which would tend to force an equilibrium that keeps firm boundaries
from shrinking further – except for one thing. The same technologies
can also reduce the transaction costs of market arrangements.
Technology permits sources of different kinds of services to find each
other, to make deals for an integrated product, and then to find
consumers and fans interested in it.
1.

Professional football

Technology is less likely to cause changes in the industry structure
for professional football, but the technological revolution is likely to
set off battles over ownership of new revenue streams for
professional sports. For example, fan capture and re-broadcast of live
games is both increasingly feasible and of uncertain status under
405
Revenues
copyright, trademark, and right-of-publicity doctrines.
from fantasy football and football-oriented video games is growing.
Broadcasts of football games not licensed by the NFL or the
teams are more likely because it is so easy to make a good video
recording with a cellphone and to upload it to YouTube, Vimeo,
Facebook, or an independent website. Whether a “guerrilla” making
and distributing of a video recording of a live football would infringe
copyright is an interesting question. In Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v.

404. Compare VOGEL, supra note 11 at 15-17 (analyzing the traditionally high barriers
to entry in entertainment industries) with Perritt, New architectures for music, supra note
11 (explaining how Internet and PC technologies have reduced barriers to entry for
musicians) and Perritt, New Business Models for Music, supra note 11 (same) and Perritt,
Technologies of Storytelling, supra note 11 (same for moviemakers).
405. See Dryer v. NFL, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (D. Minn. 2010) (denying motion for
summary judgment for defendant on claim that use of promotional video footage of live
football games infringed common law and statutory right of publicity, which were not
preempted by copryight act); Univ. of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art Inc. 677
F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (granting summary judgment to defendant on claim that
paintings and prints depicting live football games infringed college trademark in colors
and player uniforms).
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Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 406 the court of appeals
suggested that a game itself is not copyrightable, but that as soon as it
is recorded, as it usually is by those with explicit broadcast rights, the
fixation element would be satisfied and the performance of the game,
along with the audiovisual work, would be copyrighted. The court’s
analysis of the question focuses on the issue of copyright preemption
of player publicity rights in the game. It also concerns the court’s
earlier emphasis on the creative originality of the authorized video
capture that led to the resulting audio visual work. These contextual
aspects cast doubt on the robustness of its conclusion that game
performances are not copyrightable.
NFL v. McBee & Bruno’s, Inc. 407 involved a claim that display of
blacked out football games by bar owners infringed copyright. The
court of appeals agreed with the district court that it was the football
game itself—”the game action, the noncommercial elements of the
game” that constituted the work of authorship, fixed when it was
408
The defendants
broadcast by cable to non-blacked out areas.
claimed that they copied no protected elements because they stripped
out commentary and advertisements, and reproduced, distributed and
409
performed only the game itself.
The fixation, therefore, is the “original ‘works’ of
authorship” which is the opera, the dance ensemble, the
address and the game. The fact that the performance is
replete with network commercial insertions does not so
restructure the program as to make it a new original work or
410
to give it a new or final fixation.
These are questionable conclusions in light of the copyright act’s
411
explicit mandate that facts are not copyrightable and the Supreme
412
Court’s holding in Feist that the “sweat of the brow” expended in
making facts available does not make the facts—as opposed to

406. 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).
407. 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
408. Id. at 732.
409. NFL v. McBee & Bruno’s, 621 F. Supp. 880, 885-86 (E.D. Miss. 1985)
(characterizing and rejecting defendant arguments).
410. Id. at 886.
411. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
412. Feist Pub. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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selection and arrangement—copyrightable. Live football games are
facts.
These skirmishes over copyright law will channel the new forms
of competition. Whether a guerrilla broadcast of the football game
infringes copyright will determine the likelihood of the League, the
team, and the players getting a new share of the revenue generated by
such broadcasts.
Other technologies also are opening up new revenue
opportunities. In professional sports the growth in fantasy football
has been enabled by the Internet and is a potential source of revenue
413
for players and teams. Similarly, more sophisticated video games
feature celebrities of all kinds, including college and professional
athletes, resulting in a new stream of revenue the celebrities are eager
to tap.
The market for player publicity rights may fragment if a trend
develops in fantasy football and video games to allow fans to match
players from different teams. If that occurs the valuable commodity
is the individual player, not the team of which he is a member. Such a
phenomenon will increase pressure for individual players to retrieve
licensing power for their own personas. The Players Association
could band together to license player images and personalities to
fantasy football providers or video game developers. The problem
here is that the market for player publicity rights is not a labor
market; it is a product market. Already, the commercial importance
of new forms of media providing fans access to sports celebrities is
414
generating controversy. In Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., the
district court denied a motion to dismiss a right-of-publicity claim by
a former college football player against a video-game producer.
Based on the facts alleged, the court found:
In the game, the quarterback for Arizona State University
shares many of Plaintiff’s characteristics. For example, the
413. See Michael J. McSherry, The Right of Publicity and Fantasy Sports: Should
Professional Athletes Wield Control Over Their Identities or Yield to the First
Amendment?(2009), (unpublished seminar paper, Chicago-Kent College of Law) available
at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/courses/seminar/papers%202009%20fall/mike%20mcsherr
y%20-%20final%20%20The%20Right%20of%20Publicity%20and%20Fantasy%20Sports.pdf
(explaining
fantasy sports and reviewing cases giving athletes rights).
414. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8,
2010).
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virtual player wears the same jersey number, is the same
height and weight and hails from the same state. . . . EA does
not depict Plaintiff in a different form; he is represented as he
what he was [sic]: the starting quarterback for Arizona State
University. Further, . . . the game’s setting is identical to
where the public found Plaintiff during his collegiate career:
415
on the football field.
Under these circumstances, the challenged depiction was not
sufficiently transformative to escape liability under California’s right
416
of publicity. The district court granted a stay pending appeal of
417
related cases to avoid fragmenting litigation of similar issues.
418
In Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., the district court dismissed an
action by a college football player against a video game developer for
violating his state-law right of publicity. The player alleged that a
player in the video game had the same height, weight, jersey number,
type of wrist band, and helmet visor as the actual player, also using
419
statistics on playing success identical to those of the actual player.
Because the specific similarities were not pleaded, the court dismissed
with leave to file a second amended complaint setting forth the
420
specific similarities.
In the Keller case and in a related case, O’Bannon v. NCAA,421
college football and basketball players claimed that the NCAA
violated the antitrust laws by requiring college athletes to authorize
the NCAA to use their names and likenesses to promote NCAA
activities and to relinquish their rights to the commercial use of their
422
Such requirements, the athletes claimed, excluded them
images.
from the collegiate licensing market. Denying a motion to dismiss,
the district court held that the plaintiffs had pleaded an agreement
423
that restrained competition, and that they made out a case under

415. Id. at *5.
416. Id.
417. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litigation, No. C 09-1967
CW, 2010 WL 5644656 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2010).
418. 740 F. Supp. 2d 658 (D. N.J. 2010).
419. Id. at 661.
420. Id. at 669.
421. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. C 09-3329, 2010 WL 445190 at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
422. Id. at *1 (summarizing allegations).
423. Id. at *4.
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the rule of reason. 424 A multi-district panel in California reached a
425
similar conclusion.
As the market for new technologies to exploit the popularity of
entertainment industry celebrities builds, the likelihood of antitrust
426
scrutiny of collective licensing arrangements will intensify. Because
the licensing market is a product market, not linked at all directly to
any labor market, application of the labor exemption is unlikely, but
rule of reason analysis may nevertheless privilege the arrangements.
Although the technological revolution is not likely to have much
impact on labor markets in professional sports, it has already had
profound impact on product markets. The first battleground focused
on television broadcasts, as exemplified by the Supreme Court’s
decision in NCAA, considered in § III(A)(2) and the separate lawsuit
filed by the NFL Players Association over television revenues during
the 2011 lockout.
Copyright protection for football games and other athletic
contests, at least when the games are captured on video, gives the
leagues and teams a strong lever to control exploitation of revenue
potential from broader electronic distribution of actual games
through the Internet. Fantasy sports and video games, however, need
not use actual game footage. As to them, leverage is available only
427
under a common-law or statutory “right of publicity.”
The phenomenon of fantasy sports is rapidly growing, with nearly
428
$1 billion in annual revenues.
[F]antasy football refers to a game in which participants
simulate management responsibilities of the roster of a NFL

424. Id. at *5.
425. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, , No. C
09-1967 CW, 2012 WL 1745593 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss
Sherman Act complaint).
426. Collective licensing of any rights enhances market efficiency by reducing
transaction costs for both rights holders and licensees. See generally Perritt, Cut in Tiny
Pieces, supra note 11 (reviewing economics and caselaw for copyright collectives).
427. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 772-74 (reviewing history of common-law right and
referring to state statutes; granting summary judgment to video-game developer on First
Amendment grounds in right-of-publicity action brought by former college football
player)
428. See Anthony Crupi, Billion Dollar Draft Some 27 Million Americans Play Fantasy
Football—and Media Companies Are Cashing in on Their Obsession, ADWEEK, (Nov. 7,
2011)
http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/billion-dollar-draft-136370
(reporting nearly $1 billion in revenues for fantasy football in 2010).
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team by, among other things: (1) scouting, drafting, and
trading players on their teams; (2) adding and dropping
players; and (3) otherwise manipulating the team’s roster over
the course of the season-long competition. To facilitate the
competition among the participants in a given fantasy football
league, the standard fantasy football game utilizes the actual
statistics generated by NFL players during the course of the
429
regular season. The NFL has embraced fantasy football to
430
the extent that it has a link on its website.
No similar link exists for video games.
The professional sports leagues, teams, and players naturally have
an interest in tapping some of this revenue—or, less progressively, in
trying to shut it down because of a fear that it will drain market share
from the activities of the leagues. The NFL Players Association
claims exclusive group licensing rights for players’ rights of
431
publicity.
In C.B.C. Distributing & Marketing, Inc. v. Major League
432
Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., the court of appeals held that a
provider of fantasy baseball games could use baseball players’ names
and statistics without violating their right of publicity and, moreover,
433
had a First Amendment right to use them. In CBS Interactive Inc.
434
v. NFL Players Ass’n, Inc., the district court applied the Eighth
Circuit holding to fantasy football, holding that use of football player
435
identities is protected by the First Amendment. The state of the
436
In Dryer v. Nat’l
law on this question is, however, unsettled.
437
Football League, however, the district court distinguished actual
video footage of football players from the data used in fantasy

429. CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football Players Ass’n, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 398, 403 (D.
Minn. 2009) (describing phenomenon) (internal citations omitted).
430. See http://www.nfl.com/fantasyfootball (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).
431. CBS Interactive, 259 F.R.D at 402-03 (explaining NFLPA licensing activities
covering individual players’ names, signatures, facsimile, voices, pictures, photographs,
likenesses, and biographical information).
432. 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir .2007).
433. Id. at 824 (explaining why interests usually advanced to support right of publicity
do not apply to professional athletes who already are handsomely compensated).
434. 259 F.R.D. 398 (D. Minn. 2009).
435. Id. at 419.
436. Id. at 413-14 (noting Florida district court case and commentary disagreed with
Eighth Circuit).
437. Dryer, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1113.
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football, and denied a motion for summary judgment on First
Amendment grounds in a class action brought by former professional
football players against the NFL for using promotional video footage
438
of them playing.
Significantly, for purposes of this article, the fantasy sports
439
producers claimed antitrust monopolization by the NFLPA.
Congress has granted fantasy sports an exemption on prohibitions
against Internet gambling in Unlawful Internet Gambling
440
Enforcement Act of 2006, by excluding fantasy sports from the
441
definition of “bet or wager.”
Videogames based on professional sports teams and players are
442
also proliferating.
The legal issues are the same regarding
videogames as for fantasy sports.
As the technological revolution continues, controversies over who
is entitled to make money from the celebrity of professional athletes
surely will grow.
2.

Beyond football

Regardless of theoretical analysis of liability when entertainment
industry participants limit new forms of competition enabled by the
technological revolution, passivity or impracticability in enforcing the
law is likely to leave large arenas available for participants to do as
they please.
The reality is that the Labor Department does not enforce the
FLSA against the small players, and neither is the Internal Revenue
Service very aggressive about challenging independent-contractor
classifications.
If they are all employees, they are entitled to minimum wage,
unemployment compensation, and workers compensation. There are,
of course, some carve-outs for part time and casual employment,
443
and—importantly—for actors and writers.

438. Id. at 1118.
439. CBS Interactive, 259 F.R.D. at 412 (dismissing, under Noerr Pennington doctrine,
claim that enforcement efforts violated antitrust law).
440. 31 U.S.C. § 5362 (2006).
441. Id. (conditioning exemption on fantasy games not being based on the “current
membership of an actual team that is a member of an amateur or professional sports
organization”).
442. See Madden 13, EA SPORTS, http://www.easports.com/madden-nfl/features (last
visited Oct. 5, 2012) (describing features of NFL videogame).
443. See § III.B4
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Nor is trade unionism likely to be a particularly effective means
for limiting competition. As § VI(A)(2) explains, the transaction
costs of establishing and enforcing anti-competitive arrangements
becomes too high when the units of production are fragmented, and
that is precisely the effect that technology is having. Even fairly large
movies—those with budgets in the range of $2 million-$10 million, as
a very rough approximation—use significant amounts of freelance
labor. In theater, Actors Equity only penetrates approximately ten to
fifteen percent, measured by number of productions, although the
figure would be much higher measured by percentage of total
audience. AFSCME and SAG have little sway in indie movie
production. The AFM is perhaps the strongest example, when one
looks at the full range of musical performances and music recording
activity in an urban area. The AFM does community service work for
all musicians but attempts to organize the smaller entities and fluid
groups of musicians who are unknown.
The reality is that many of the producing entities are simply not
on anyone’s radar screen. In some cases they are not formal business
entities, but sole proprietorships or common-law partnerships. Even
in those cases when the entities have registered as corporations or
LLCs, there are too many of them for any trade union to organize
them cost effectively. So the unions do not try. And any rational
administrative agency is going to set enforcement priorities. It is hard
to conceive of a rational enforcement strategy that would devote
significant resources to targeting the low-end. The result is a formal
regime that bears little resemblance to the actual structure of labor
markets in the entertainment industry.
Moreover, the enforcement strategies of administrative agencies
in the labor field have always been influenced heavily by what trade
unions think is important. So what will trade unions think is
important? Equity, SAG/AFTRA, and the AFM are reasonably
strong unions.
So are the AFL Players Association and its
counterparts in other sports.
Some ideas can be gleaned from tensions between union and
nonunion construction, union and nonunion trucking, and heavily
unionized and nonunion, or only partially unionized airlines. And for
all of these cases, the threat to collectively bargained labor standards
and union security appeared not in the form of new labor market
phenomena (contracting out being a notable exception). Rather, it
appeared in the form of new product market competition.
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So where is this most likely in the entertainment industry? It is
not at all likely in professional football. The notion that arena
football could begin to steal market share from the NFL is ludicrous.
On the other hand, newly rising sports like soccer could begin to gain
market share at the expense of other sports, making it a threat.
In music, the product market transformation is probably too far
gone for the union movement to do anything about it. The recording
industry is still clinging on to some established celebrities, but the
relationship between artists and recording studios has never been
444
understood to be an employment relationship. That means that the
AFM has no beachhead from which to operate with respect to
recorded music.
Likewise, in theater, something like the current market structure
is likely to persist. The much greater audience drawing-power of
larger equity theaters compared with smaller storefront theaters is
profound, and the migration from the lower stratum for the higher
strata is very much a part of the ambition of actors and other theater
people.
It is in video entertainment where the changes are likely to be
most dramatic. The possibility for crowd sourcing of important
445
functions in moviemaking, the entry of new Internet-oriented
entities like Amazon, Google, Hulu, and Netflix, and the ease with
which truly indie moviemakers can use the same tools now being
embraced by the large players to distribute video entertainment
products all portend significant turmoil in the years to come as the
technological revolution continues.
It has always been the case that well-established enterprises uses
every tool at their disposal—labor law, antitrust law, aggressive
business and litigation credit strategies—to crush or at least defer the
success of new entrants using new business models. These enterprises
will do so in this case, also.
In dealing with its increasing inventory of disputes, antitrust law
must balance certain fundamental marketplace realities. Economies
of scale are likely for Internet Service Providers, social networks such
444. But see Wendy N. Davis, Reliving the Golden Oldies: Rockers Reclaim Tunes
After Revised Copyright Laws, ABA JOURNAL (May 1, 2012 3:20 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/reliving-the-golden-oldies-rockers-reclaimtunes-after-revised-copyright-la/.
445. See Perritt, Technologies of Storytelling, supra note 11 (discussing crowd sourcing
as movie production strategy to reduce costs); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Crowd Sourcing for
Moviemaking (forthcoming).
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as Facebook, web search engines such as Google, and movie and
music portals such as NetFlix and iTunes. These parts of the industry
will attract large aggregations of capital and may engage in cross
subsidization of new product lines. They will find themselves pitted
against the desire of fading establishments to throw up barriers to
new, more efficient competitors on the one hand, and the desire of
artists to be able to support themselves with their art by offering it to
consumers through the large intermediaries.
Fragmentation of production is only one aspect of the technologydriven market structure changes. Some activities enjoy considerable
economies of scale. The Internet increases economies of scale for
sales of tickets to entertainment events, and increases economies of
scope for linking ticket sales to exhibition of the related events. One
result was the merger of Ticketmaster with Live Nation, approved by
446
United States Department of Justice in 2010.
The dominance of such intermediaries naturally leads to
447
controversies over monopolization and commercial relations.
As Internet-based coordination networks proliferate to manage
transaction costs in a fragmented marketplace, controversies over
who gets access to these networks will increase.
3.

Two hypothetical scenarios

Two closely related fictional scenarios help integrate the analysis
of the types of disputes likely to arise in the entertainment industries
448
under pressure from the technological revolution.
Amory Richards is a young cinematographer employed by Walt
Disney Studios.
He is represented by the International
Cinematographers Guild, part of the International Alliance of

446. Justice Department Requires Ticketmaster Entertainment Inc. to Make Significant
Changes to Its Merger with Live Nation Inc., JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, (Jan. 25, 2010) http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/10-at-081.html
(requiring, as condition of merger approval, licensing of ticketing software, divestiture of
ticketing assets and anti-retaliation provisions).
447. See, e.g. McMillan v. Live Nation Entm’t, Inc., No. 11-732, 2012 Ark. 166 (Ark.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 2012).(answering certified question as to whether claim that
Ticketmaster fees exceeded ticket price violated state statute prohibiting excessive fees);
Live Nation Worldwide, Inc. v. Hillside Prod., Inc., No. 10-11395. 2012 WL 1239844 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 30, 2011) (granting summary judgment to plaintiff in dispute over accounting
for revenues from exhibitions of entertainment).
448. The good analysis in this section was written by Jeremy B. Abrams, research
assistant to the author.
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Theatrical Stage Employees (“IATSE”), of which he is a member. A
collective bargaining agreement covers his employment.
Selnick Edwards is a young video editor employed by the
production division of Comcast. The National Association of
Broadcast Employees and Technicians (“NABET”), part of the
Communications Workers of America (“CWA”) represents Comcast
video editors, but Selnick has elected not to become a member,
electing instead to pay an agency fee to the union under an agencyshop agreement. A collective bargaining agreement covers Selnick’s
employment with Comcast.
Amory and Selnick studied filmmaking at Columbia College in
Chicago with Kendrick Marshall. Kendrick has entered into an
agreement with a recent graduate of Chicago-Kent College of Law,
Andrew Zeer, to produce Andrew’s screenplay, No Fun League.
Kendrick has worked out a shot list and shooting schedule and is
ready to begin principal photography. He contacts Amory and asks
him to be the cinematographer. Amory is excited and agrees to take
part in the project “on spec;” i.e., he won’t get paid anything unless
the movie makes money. If it does, he will get five percent of the net
profits. Kendrick makes a similar deal with Selnick to be the editor
of No Fun League.
Disney has heard about No Fun League and is quite worried that
it will dilute the audience for Disney’s new blockbuster, Mouseketeers
Retreaded Again, featuring Justin Timberlake, Keri Russell, and Ryan
Gosling. The budget for Mouseketeers Retreaded Again is $200
million. The budget for No Fun League is $75,000. Disney figures
that No Fun League will never get made if Marshall has to pay
Amory the same compensation he is entitled to from Disney.
The cinematographers are concerned about the impact on their
wage levels. They also understand that if the market for Disney’s
movie is reduced, that will undermine employment opportunities.
Disney communicates its fear to the cinematographers.
The
cinematographers pick up the ball. They tell Disney to fire Amory
and tell Amory the union will expel him and make sure Disney fires
him if he continues to work for Kendrick for any less than Disney
pays him.
Comcast is likewise worried that No Fun League will prove so
popular that Comcast subscribers will drop their subscriptions and
flock to see No Fun League on the Internet, paying for it through
their Amazon accounts. It tells Selnick that he will be fired if he
works for Kendrick for any less than what he is paid by Comcast.
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What legal claims might Amory and Selnick have against Disney,
the Cinematographers Guild, Comcast or NABET? How strong are
they?
In order to determine whether Amory, Selnick, or Marshall could
recover against the IATSE, Disney, or Comcast, one must
understand: (1) whether the conduct they object to is exempt from
antitrust law; (2) whether it would survive rule-of-reason scrutiny if it
is not exempt; (3) whether any of them have antitrust standing; and
(4) whether the conduct constitutes a secondary boycott under the
NLRA.
Plaintiffs could argue that neither the actions of the IATSE or
Disney fall within the statutory exemption provided by the Clayton
Act and Norris-LaGuardia, or the non-statutory labor exemption
created by the judiciary. Thus, if they have standing, Amory and
Marshall would be in a strong position to prevail against IATSE and
Disney for violating the Sherman Act by colluding with each other to
restrain trade.
In the case at hand, there are two ways Amory’s activity could
negatively impact the wages of Disney’s union employees: (1) the
union’s bargaining position could be weakened, eventually driving
down the wages of union members; (2) the success of No Fun League
could increase competition in the product market, thereby driving
down Disney’s revenue and, eventually, the wages, and even job
security, of union members.
Protecting the union’s bargaining position is a legitimate objective
that fails the rule of reason test.
The IATSE would argue that its action to prevent Amory from
working for Marshall at anything less than Disney standards falls
within the exemption because it is necessary to protect its collectively
bargained standards. Amory is not likely to be unique. If he is
willing to work for Marshall for less than his compensation at Disney,
others will do the same thing—for Kendrick and others like him.
Disney could reduce its costs by laying off its employees, including
Amory, and hiring Marshall and others like him to do their
work. Every employer wants to buy labor at the lowest possible
price.
Without a wage floor, competition between potential
employees will drive down wages—at least when the labor supply
exceeds the demand. Preventing the driving down of wages is the
central goal of collective bargaining. Thus, if a large number of
workers on the job market seek to work below union wages, Disney
could replace union employees with the cheaper alternatives.
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Seeking to maintain this form of “uniformity of labor standards” is a
“legitimate aim” of the IATSE. It thus appears that this side
agreement is subject to the non-statutory labor exemption.
If, however, it is found that the antitrust laws do apply, the
question becomes whether the IATSE’s side agreement with Amory
is a per se violation or, if not, whether it passes the rule of reason.
Non-compete agreements between employers and their employees
449
are not per se violations of the Sherman Act.
A non-compete
agreement prohibits an employee of one company from working for a
competitor under any conditions. It follows fortiori that a less
stringent agreement between an employer and an employee (such as
the one between Disney and Amory) that prohibits an employee
from working for a competitor if certain conditions are not met is also
not a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
While the IATSE’s side agreement with Amory may not be a per
se violation of the Sherman Act, it is a violation under the rule of
reason. Large production companies like Disney can afford to pay
more to their employees than their independent competitors can.
Allowing unions to forbid members from working below the high
standards set by these companies would risk putting independent
production companies out of business. Such a result would have a
devastating effect on the competitive nature of the product-market.
The benefit provided to the union (strengthened bargaining position)
does not outweigh the harm caused to independent producers
(elimination).
Decreasing competition in the product-market in order to protect
the labor market is not a legitimate objective; even if it were, it fails
the rule of reason test.
Plaintiffs would argue that IATSE does not have the power to
stay within the labor exemption while preventing the impact that No
Fun League’s financial success would have on union wages. While a
union’s direct activities on the labor market may have an indirect
impact on the product market, any activity taken by a union to impact

449. Haines v. Verimed Healthcare Network, 613 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1137 (2009)
(explaining that non-compete agreements are “a common feature of countless
independent contractor relationships in any number of industries” and does not constitute
a per se violation of the Sherman Act); Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 144-47 (3d
Cir. 2001) (explaining that non-compete agreements that are reasonable in scope do not
violate antitrust laws under the rule of reason).
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the product market directly constitutes an illegitimate objective that
is not exempt from antitrust law.
Plaintiffs would argue that the IATSE could prevent harm to
union wages due to increased competition in the product market only
by actually limiting competition in the product market. In this case, it
is known that Amory is essential to the existence of Disney’s
competitor in the product market (i.e., No Fun League). IATSE’s
conduct would not be exempt from antitrust law if it intended to shut
down No Fun League by making Amory unaffordable.
Even if IATSE’s objective is legitimate, IATSE’s conduct would
not pass the rule of reason. Once again, the minor benefit such side
agreements would have on the labor market does not outweigh the
potentially “significant adverse effects on the market and on
consumers-effects unrelated to the union’s legitimate goals of
450
organizing workers and standardizing working conditions.”
The side agreement between Comcast and Selnick requires a
simpler analysis. Comcast is a non-labor organization seeking to
negotiate with a member of a labor group (e.g., Selnick) for the sole
purpose of manipulating the product market. Thus, as with Amory,
plaintiff’s would argue that Comcast’s objective is illegitimate and
does not pass the rule of reason.
While a union’s direct activities on the labor market may have an
indirect impact on the product-market, any activity taken by a union
to impact the product-market directly constitutes an illegitimate
objective that is not exempt from antitrust regulations.
As with IATSE, even if Comcast has a legitimate objective, its
conduct would not pass the rule of reason. Once again, the minor
benefit such side agreements would have on the labor market does
not outweigh the potentially “significant adverse effects on the
market and on consumers-effects unrelated to the union’s legitimate
451
goals of organizing workers and standardizing working conditions.”
Simply establishing an agreement that falls outside the
exemptions and fails rule of reason analysis, however, is not enough
to allow Amory, Selnick, or Marshall to recover for the antitrust
violation; they must also have standing. Amory, Selnick, and

450. Connell Const. Co., Inc. 421 U.S. at 624 (holding that union’s attempt to force
contractor to not subcontract work to firms that did not already have a contract with the
union is not exempt from antitrust laws because “it contravenes antitrust policies to a
degree not justified by congressional labor policy”).
451. Id.
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Marshall are going to have a hard time establishing standing to sue
for antitrust violations. The class of plaintiffs capable of establishing
antitrust standing is limited to consumers and competitors in the
452
restrained market.
CBC Companies, Inc. v. Equifax, Inc. 453 involved section 1 and 2
Sherman Act claims against Equifax for hiking the fees it imposed on
the plaintiff for reselling Equifax credit data. The plaintiff claimed
monopolization and attempted monopolization of the market for
454
credit reports sold to mortgage lenders.
The court of appeals
agreed with the district court that the plaintiff had failed to plead
antitrust injury.
To prove antitrust injury, the key inquiry is whether
competition—not necessarily a competitor-suffered as a result
of the challenged business practice. One competitor may not
use the antitrust laws to sue a rival merely for vigorous or
intensified competition. . . . An antitrust plaintiff [must]
demonstrate that the alleged violation tended to reduce
competition overall and that the plaintiff’s injury was a
455
consequence of the resulting diminished competition.
Although the complaint alleged that the plaintiff and other
resellers were the principal victims of Equifax’s conduct, it “never
identifies any of these other resellers, and never establishes whether
any of these resellers signed a contract similar to the Reseller
456
Agreement.”
Essentially, CBC disagrees with the price terms of the
contract that Equifax proposed and CBC later signed. But
even where a business carries a significant portion of the
market share, antitrust law is not a negotiating tool for a
plaintiff seeking better contract terms. Section 2 of the
Sherman Act does not give plaintiffs the exclusive right to

452. West Penn Allegheny Health Sys, Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 102 (3d Cir. 2010)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant in part and holding that an agreement with
the dominant hospital artificially to depress prices paid by a monopsonist health insurer
by the second hospital established antitrust injury).
453. 561 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2009).
454. Id. at 571 (summarizing legal theory).
455. Id. at 571-572 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
456. Id. at 572.
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dictate the terms on which they will deal, nor does it require
457
the defendant to accede to every demand of the plaintiffs.
That means that Amory and Selnick cannot establish antitrust
standing merely by showing that they, as individuals, were deprived
of the opportunity to sell their services to Marshall; they would have
to show that the conduct by Disney, Comcast, and the unions reduced
competition in the market for indie cinematographers and editors
generally and that they were injured as a result. Likewise, Marshall
cannot establish antitrust injury unless he pleads and proves that the
conduct diminished competition in the movie production market and
that he was injured as a result.
458
Sterling Merchandising, Inc. v. Nestle, S.A. involved sections 1
and 2 Sherman Act claims against the dominant supplier of ice cream
in Puerto Rico for its acquisition of a distributor that competed with
the plaintiff and its subsequent pricing and contracting policies. The
plaintiff was dependent on the defendant for its most popular brand
of ice cream. The court of appeals, agreeing with the district court,
held that the plaintiff failed, at the summary judgment stage, to show
antitrust injury, because the evidence showed that the plaintiff’s
market share and profits had increased during the period of the
allegedly illegal conduct and that the defendant continued to make
ice cream available to it. The plaintiff argued that it would have done
even better but for the defendant’s conduct, but the court found
evidence supporting that proposition unpersuasive:
The lack of evidence of antitrust injury in the form of either
increased consumer prices or reduced output is consistent
with the lack of evidence that Sterling itself has been
negatively affected by Nestlé PR’s purported violations. It is
axiomatic that antitrust laws are concerned with protecting
against impairments to a market’s competitiveness and not
impairments to any one market actor. It is also true that an
antitrust plaintiff’s post-violation successes do not necessarily
preclude compensation for damages proximately caused by an
antitrust violation. Nonetheless, that Sterling’s sales, profits,
and market share have increased during the relevant period

457. Id. at 573 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
458. 656 F.3d 112 (1st Cir. 2011).
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provides further indication that no antitrust injury exists
459
here.
That suggests that Amory, Selnick, and Marshall could establish
antitrust injury only if they offered evidence that competition in the
movie production market and in the markets for indie
cinematographers and editors was declining, resulting in declining
revenues and market share for indie producers and declining demand
for indie cinematographers and editors.
Moreover, Amory and Selnick may have difficulty establishing
the directness of any injury to them. In Associated General
460
Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, the Supreme
Court cautioned against allowing antitrust injury to be established by
a long chain of causation:
In this case . . . the Union was neither a consumer nor a
competitor in the market in which trade was restrained. It is
not clear whether the Union’s interests would be served or
disserved by enhanced competition in the market. . . [T]he
chain of causation between the Union’s injury and the alleged
restraint in the market for construction subcontracts contains
461
several somewhat vaguely defined links.
....
Partly because it is indirect, and partly because the alleged
effects on the Union may have been produced by independent
factors, the Union’s damages claim is also highly speculative.
There is, for example, no allegation that any collective
bargaining agreement was terminated as a result of the
coercion, no allegation that the aggregate share of the
contracting market controlled by union firms has diminished,
no allegation that the number of employed union members
has declined, and no allegation that the Union’s revenues in
the form of dues or initiation fees have decreased. Moreover,
although coercion against certain firms is alleged, there is no

459. Id. at 122-23 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
460. 459 U.S. 519 (1983) (reversing court of appeals and holding that union claiming a
conspiracy to shift work from union to non-union contracts could not establish antitrust
injury).
461. Id. at 539-40.
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assertion that any such firm was prevented from doing
business with any union firms or that any firm or group of
462
firms was subjected to a complete boycott.
Amory and Selnick would have to establish that they lost
employment opportunities because they were forced to demand
higher compensation. If other indie cinematographers and editors
remain free to work for less, that would help them establish
individual injury but would undercut their argument that competition
in general had been limited. Marshall would have to establish that
he, along with other indie producers, lost business as a result of the
limitations on wage competition. To do that, he would have to
marshal evidence that: (a) Disney and Comcast had sufficient market
power to drive up wages in the indie producer market; (b) the
increased wages adversely affected Marshall’s ability to earn revenue;
and (c) any economic misfortune suffered by Marshall was not due to
other factors.
All of this is a very tall order, necessitating heroic econometric
analysis, unlikely to be available to any of the plausible plaintiffs.
It is likely that both the agreement between the IATSE and
Amory or the agreement between Comcast and Selnick violate
United States antitrust law. Neither agreement falls within the
statutory or non-statutory labor exemptions to antitrust law. Amory,
Selnick and Marshall would have a very hard time, however,
establishing standing to sue IATSE, Disney, or Comcast for antitrust
violations.
If the conduct violates §§ 8(b)(4) or 8(e) of the NLRA, Amory,
463
Selnick, and Marshall can sue for damages under labor law, but
coverage by § 8(b)(4) prevents a direct antitrust claim under the
464
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

462. Id. at 542.
463. 29 U.S.C. § 187.
464. Compare Baker v. IBP, Inc. 357 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that
preemption has nothing to do with federal claims filed in federal court but that doctrines
of primary jurisdiction and abstention may require federal court to defer exercise of
jurisdiction pending action before NLRB) and Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525
U.S. 33, 56 (1998) (holding that district court lacked jurisdiction over duty-of-fairrepresentation claim by actress denied a movie role because she did not pay union dues in
advance; compliance with union-security clause proviso in 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) was
within primary jurisdiction of NLRB) with Smart v. Local 702, IBEW, 562 F.3d 798, 80809 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that state antitrust claim was completely preempted because
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The § 8(b)(4)B)(ii) argument with respect to both Amory and
Selnick is that the union is: “forcing or requiring any person [Amory
and Selnick] . . . to cease doing business with any other person
465
The elements are: (a) whether the union is (b)
[Kendrick] . . . .
466
“forcing or requiring” (c) someone to cease doing business with
someone else, and (d) whether a literal violation is an actual
violation, given that the target of the subsection is “secondary”
pressure. What’s the primary dispute?

VII.Hope for the future
The technology-driven revolution in the entertainment industries
has enormous potential to enrich art, broaden the entertainment
choices available to everyone, and increase the probability that artists
can earn the personal fulfillment that comes from exposing their art
to people who enjoy it. For that potential to be realized, however,
legal and political institutions must embrace certain propositions
about the revolution and its likely outcomes and be guided by certain
other propositions about government intervention.
Economies of scale yield larger and larger bottlenecks that have
the power to erect barriers to entry and are few enough in number to
467
be organized effectively.
The most promising fountains of creative innovation are too small
to challenge the barriers and too numerous to be organized.

non-union contractor fired by construction project due to union pressure had arguable
claim under section 8(b)(4)).
465. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B)(ii).
466. See Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, 949 F.2d 1241, 1255-56 (3d
Cir. 1991) (finding that threat to cancel pre-hire agreement may constitute coercion under
8(b)(4); Sheet Metal Workers, Local Union No. 91 v. N.L.R.B., 905 F.2d 417, 421 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (finding coercion under 8(b)(4) from union threatening to withhold wage
concessions unless employer agreed to terminate relations with non-union firms in
violation of section 8(e)); N.L.R.B. v. Local 825, A,B,C,D, Int’l Union of Operating
Engineers, 659 F.2d 379, 385 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding that warning by union business agent
about non-union contractor coming on job site did not constitute “threat” under 8(b)(4)).
467. The Federal Circuit recognized the legitimacy of considering economies of scale
on the pro-competitive side of the balancing in rule of reason analysis. Princo Corp. v. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The case involved a claim of patent
misuse by an importer, alleging that horizontal agreements among patent holders to set
standards violated the rule of reason. 616 F.3d at 1335. The court of appeals, agreeing with
the Int’l Trade Commission, held that the pro-competitive effect of the standards for
writable CDs past muster under rule of reason analysis; See also Golden Bridge Tech. Inc.
v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting Sherman Act claim that
standards-enforcement activity violated rule of reason; considering economies of scale).
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Governmental institutions are, for the most part, unlikely to fill
the breach because they have been captured by the defenders of the
old, who are terrified by the new and emerging empires that want to
protect and enhance their market dominance. Because of this, the
safest course is a presumption of legal abstention and reliance on
markets to sort out supply and demand for new products. So far, the
Internet has proven its capacity to facilitate largely unregulated
markets in the entertainment and in other industries. Most of the
threats to innovation have come from expansive interpretations of the
scope of overaggressive enforcement of copyright and other forms of
intellectual property. Traditional labor unions have played a
miniscule role, and antitrust litigation has operated only at the
margins. For the benefits of innovation in all forms of entertainment
to enrich the future, the following four principles should guide
468
policy:
1. Enact Net Neutrality legislation and defend its principles
against copyright-enforcement overreaching.
2. Do not try to break up Google, Amazon, or Netflix merely
because they are big and dominate their markets. In United States v.
469
the Supreme Court recognized that
Falstaff Brewing Corp.,
technology may produce increasing economies of scale that lead to
concentration in an industry—legitimate under the antitrust laws—
while also making it easier for the smaller number of competitors to
engage in “parallel policies of mutual advantage” rather than letting
470
competition flourish.
3. Re-educate the public, the judiciary, and the bar about
copyright, trademark, and rights-of-publicity to counter the
propaganda of the old guard.
4. Hope for more grassroots Internet-oriented movements such as
the Net Neutrality movement and the anti-PROTECT IP SOPA
movements.

468. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet at 20: Evolution of a Constitution for
Cyberspace, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J.. 1115, 1179 (2012) (arguing that the Internet’s
“constitution” has been validated by the Internet’s success).
469. 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
470. Id. at 550-51 (reversing judgment for defendant in Clayton Act suit to enjoin
acquisition of competing beer producer).
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